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Women and peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. On 5 October 2009, the Security Council adopted resolution 1889 (2009), by which it reaffirmed its commitment to the continuing and full implementation, in a mutually reinforcing manner, of its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1612 (2005), 1674 (2006), 1820 (2008), 1882 (2009) and 1888 (2009). The Council expressed its continuing deep concern about the persistent obstacles to women's full involvement in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and their participation in post-conflict public life. It acknowledged that the marginalization of women can delay or undermine the achievement of sustainable peace, security and reconciliation.

2. The Council welcomed the efforts of Member States in implementing its resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level and encouraged them to continue to pursue such implementation.

3. In paragraph 17 of its resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to it within six months, for consideration, a set of indicators for use at the global level to track implementation of its resolution 1325 (2000), which could serve as a common basis for reporting by relevant United Nations entities, other international and regional organizations, and Member States, on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) in 2010 and beyond. The present report is submitted in accordance with that request.

II. The role of indicators in monitoring implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)

4. Indicators are signposts of change; a means for determining the status quo and the progress towards the intended goal. They indicate trends and allow for tracking of progress towards intended results. Indicators are critical for effective monitoring and evaluation, and they help to:

(a) Improve decision-making for ongoing programme and project management;

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(b) Measure progress and achievements as understood by the different stakeholders;

(c) Clarify consistency between activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts;

(d) Ensure accountability to all stakeholders by demonstrating progress;

(e) Assess programme, project and staff performance;

(f) Identify the need for corrective or remedial action.

5. The development of indicators is a wide-ranging and multifaceted process which aims to bring together basic statistics from many different fields and data-collection programmes. They are invaluable in planning, policymaking, research and monitoring and reporting.

6. A comprehensive set of indicators has the potential to help to identify areas of implementation requiring urgent attention. Knowledge of where implementation has been more or less successful also provides evidence to ground optimal programming in best and effective practices. Indicators that can be applied globally, as requested in Security Council resolution 1889 (2009), are thus a major step towards fostering more effective, concerted and coordinated action to implement the resolution. It is important to emphasize that the set of indicators is intended to act as a complement to existing analytical reporting mechanisms on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000).

III. The process for the development of the set of indicators

7. In response to the Security Council request, the Inter-Agency Task Force on Women and Peace and Security, chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, established a Technical Working Group on Global Indicators for resolution 1325 (2000), coordinated by the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, to define the requested set of indicators. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) served as the technical lead of the 15-entity Working Group. The Working Group established a set of principles to guide the development of indicators, as follows:

(a) Indicators must be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound;

(b) Indicators should be gender-sensitive, and include both qualitative and quantitative features, so as to be capable of tracking changes at the local, national, regional and international levels;

(c) The indicators would be organized in line with the five pillars of the 2008-2009 United Nations System-wide Action Plan on implementing resolution 1325 (2000);

(d) The indicators would be developed through a consultative process and would draw from a mapping exercise of existing indicators. New indicators would be developed where gaps in monitoring and data collection were identified.

A. Thematic framework

8. All activities of United Nations entities under the 2008-2009 System-wide Action Plan were organized around five thematic areas, namely, prevention, participation, protection, relief and recovery, and normative. The Technical Working Group developed indicators in four of these thematic areas, prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery, as the fifth thematic area, normative, was determined to be cross-cutting, and therefore incorporated within the four areas selected.

9. The 2008-2009 United Nations System-wide Action Plan outlined goals under each of the thematic areas (S/2007/567, para. 42) as follows:

(a) *Prevention*: mainstream a gender perspective into all conflict prevention activities and strategies, develop effective gender-sensitive early warning mechanisms and institutions, and strengthen efforts to prevent violence against women, including various forms of gender-based violence;

(b) *Participation*: promote and support women's active and meaningful participation in all peace processes as well as their representation in formal and informal decision-making at all levels; improve partnership and networking with local and international women's rights groups and organizations; recruit and appoint women to senior positions in the United Nations, including Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, and in peacekeeping forces, including military, police and civilian personnel;

(c) *Protection*: strengthen and amplify efforts to secure the safety, physical or mental health, well-being, economic security and/or dignity of women and girls; promote and safeguard human rights of women and mainstream a gender perspective into the legal and institutional reforms;

(d) *Relief and recovery*: promote women's equal access to aid distribution mechanisms and services, including those dealing with the specific needs of women and girls in all relief recovery efforts.

B. Consultative process

10. The Technical Working Group initiated a comprehensive and inclusive process to collect information on indicators that were in use across the United Nations system and by national Governments and other organizations. The results of the mapping exercise yielded more than 2,500 indicators. In a broad inter-agency process, this initial set was reviewed. After comprehensive assessments, a shortlist was developed. Stakeholders involved in the consultations included civil society, technical experts and Member States. Consultations were also held with United Nations entities at the principal level and informally with members of the Security Council.

11. The list of indicators presented in this report is thus the culmination of an extensive and inclusive consultative process.

IV. Proposed indicators

12. This section provides brief descriptions of the proposed indicators. Each indicator is linked to a specific goal. In order to highlight how the indicators dovetail with Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), references are made to relevant paragraphs of those resolutions. Tables 1 to 4 provide a more detailed presentation of the indicators.

Prevention

13. Indicators for this pillar measure progress towards the prevention of conflict and of violations of women's and girls' human rights, including sexual and gender-based violence. The indicators respond to calls in resolutions 1325 (2000) (paras. 2, 5 to 11, 14, 17 and 18) and 1820 (2008) (paras. 3 and 15) for the regular monitoring of the situation of women and girls. They also respond to a need for the development of specific guidelines and protocols for the justice and security actors, as well as the development of systems for reporting abuses and ensuring accountability of both peacekeepers and national security actors.

Indicator 1: Incidence of sexual violence in conflict-affected countries

14. This is an impact indicator and is proposed to monitor progress in the prevention of all forms of violence against women and girls, particularly sexual and gender-based violence. The indicator is responsive to paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1325 (2000) and paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1820 (2008). The data needed would be collected using surveys and could be disaggregated by types of sexual violence as well as the sub-groups of population among which violence occurs.

Indicator 2: Extent to which United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions include information on violations of women's and girls' human rights in their periodic reporting

15. The periodic reports of peacekeeping and special political missions on conflict-affected countries are an important source of information for the United Nations Secretariat and the Security Council members. This indicator seeks to track the extent to which violations against women's and girls' human rights are identified, recorded and addressed. The indicator will be based on situation reports and the Secretary-General's country reports. This indicator is responsive to paragraphs 5 and 17 of resolution 1325 (2000) and paragraph 15 of resolution 1820 (2009).

Indicator 3 (a): Number of violations of women's and girls' human rights that are reported, referred and investigated by human rights bodies

Indicator 3 (b): Inclusion of representatives of women's and civil society organizations in the governance and leadership of human rights bodies

16. These indicators assess the extent to which human rights bodies monitor violations of the human rights of women and girls. Particular attention will be paid to coverage of cases reported, referred and investigated, as well as participation of representatives of women's organizations in the governance and leadership of

human rights bodies. This set of indicators is responsive to paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 4: Percentage of reported cases of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by uniformed and civilian peacekeepers and humanitarian workers that are referred, investigated and acted upon

17. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 8 of resolution 1325 (2000). Information would be disaggregated by the type of perpetrator (uniformed, civilian peacekeeper, humanitarian worker) as well as by the types of actions taken, such as repatriation.

Indicator 5 (a): Number and percentage of directives for peacekeepers issued by heads of military components and standard operating procedures that include measures to protect women's and girls' human rights

Indicator 5 (b): Number and percentage of military manuals, national security policy frameworks, codes of conduct and standard operating procedures/ protocols of national security forces that include measures to protect women's and girls' human rights

18. Indicators 5 (a) and 5 (b), together with indicator 4, are intended to assess the extent to which international, national and non-State security actors are responsive to, and are held accountable for, any violations of the rights of women and girls, in line with international standards. Indicators 5 (a) and 5 (b) address the responsiveness of security forces to the specific security needs of women in particular contexts by identifying specific measures included in directives, manuals, codes of conduct, standard operating procedures and other resources aimed at preventing violations of women's and girls' human rights. The indicators are responsive to paragraph 6 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 6: Number and type of actions taken by the Security Council related to resolution 1325 (2000), including those that prevent and address violations of the human rights of women and girls in conflict-affected situations

19. This indicator is responsive to paragraphs 14 and 18 of resolution 1325 (2000). It is intended to assess the extent to which the Security Council remains actively seized of issues related to women and peace and security as indicated in those paragraphs of the resolution.

Indicator 7: Number and proportion of women in decision-making roles in relevant regional organizations involved in preventing conflict

20. Regional organizations play a key role in addressing conflict within their respective regions. The involvement of women in decision-making roles in these organizations can allow a gender perspective to be brought into the discussions at an early stage. This indicator is responsive to paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1325 (2000). Indicators 6 and 7 would ensure that provisions addressing the specific needs and issues of women and girls are included in early warning systems and conflict prevention mechanisms and that their implementation is monitored.

Participation

21. Indicators for this pillar would allow the monitoring of progress in ensuring the inclusion of women and women's interests in decision-making processes related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, as called for by resolution 1325 (2000) (paras. 1 to 4, 8, 15 and 16). The indicators also help to assess the extent to which women participate in reaching peace agreements and in peacebuilding.

Indicator 8: Number and percentage of peace agreements with specific provisions to improve the security and status of women and girls

22. This impact indicator is intended to address the inclusion of women's and girls' interests in decision-making processes related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The indicator is responsive to paragraphs 8 and 16 of resolution 1325 (2000). Specific areas in which provisions should be made to improve the security of women and girls include ceasefire agreements, resolving border disputes or issues, economic restructuring, transitional agreements and peacekeeping operations.

Indicator 9: Number and percentage of women in senior United Nations decision-making positions in conflict-affected countries

Indicator 10: Level of gender expertise in United Nations decision-making in conflict-affected countries

23. Indicators 9 and 10 are responsive to paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1325 (2000). The indicators aim to track the representation and participation of women in United Nations and other international missions related to peace and security. Data on indicator 9 would be disaggregated to include the number and percentage of women in senior positions at the United Nations and the number and percentage of women uniformed and civilian peacekeeping personnel in decision-making positions (at the level of Colonel or at P-5 level and higher).

Indicator 11 (a): Level of participation of women in formal peace negotiations

Indicator 11 (b): Presence of women in a formal observer or consultative status at the beginning and the end of peace negotiations

24. The monitoring of these indicators is intended to keep track of the representation and meaningful participation of women in formal and informal peace negotiations and peacebuilding processes. For indicator 11 (a), attention would be paid to the number and percentage of women mediators and negotiators in formal peace negotiations. These indicators reflect the goals of paragraph 2 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 12: Level of women's political participation in conflict-affected countries

25. This indicator tracks the meaningful representation and participation of women in governance structures. The five components include the percentages of women who are registered to vote, those who actually vote, those who are parliamentary

candidates, those actually in parliaments and those in ministerial positions. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 1 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 13: Number and percentage of Security Council missions that address specific issues affecting women and girls in their terms of reference and the mission reports

26. Indicator 13 is intended to track the consistency with which the Security Council remains seized of issues related to the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000). Indicator 13 is responsive to paragraph 15 of resolution 1325 (2000) and paragraphs 1 and 5 of resolution 1820 (2008).

Protection

27. Indicators for this pillar measure progress towards protecting and promoting the human rights of women and girls and ensuring their physical safety, health and economic security, as called for in resolution 1325 (2000). These indicators respond to paragraphs 1, 7 to 9, 11 and 12 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 14: Index of women's and girls' physical security

28. This indicator addresses the safety and physical and mental health of women and girls and their economic security. Given the difficulty of collecting reliable data on perceptions of physical security, it is proposed that data on this indicator be collected through consistent, replicable and ethical surveys. Proxy variables could be considered in measuring how the ability of women and girls to participate in public life has been affected by conflict. Data would be disaggregated by relevant vulnerable groups including internally displaced populations, indigenous peoples, and rural or urban residence. Indicator 14 is responsive to paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 15: Extent to which national laws protect women's and girls' human rights in line with international standards

29. This indicator would track the political, economic, social and cultural rights of women and girls to ensure that they are protected and enforced by national laws in line with international standards. Legislation to be tracked would include constitutions and penal and civil codes. Specific laws relating to inheritance rights, including land, property and citizenship, and minimum age at marriage, forced marriage and criminalization of gender-based violence would also be examined. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 7 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 16: Level of women's participation in the justice and security sector in conflict-affected countries

30. This indicator would cover various components including the representation of women in the military, armed and security services, police force, and the judiciary, including traditional courts where relevant. All indicators are expected to be disaggregated by decision-making levels and ranks, as applicable. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 1 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 17: Existence of national mechanisms for control of small arms and light weapons

31. This indicator seeks to track the existence and gender sensitivity of operational mechanisms and structures in place for ensuring the physical security and safety of women and girls. Since small arms and light weapons are difficult to monitor, the existence of a mechanism to regulate their access and use can be a proxy for the degree of physical security in a conflict setting. It is proposed to track this indicator using data on the existence of a national coordination agency on small arms and light weapons and the number and types of small arms and light weapons available per 10,000 population.

Indicator 18: Women as a percentage of the adults employed in early economic recovery programmes

32. This indicator responds to paragraph 9 of resolution 1325 (2000) and measures the extent to which women benefit directly from programmes aimed at economic recovery. Such programmes could include those providing employment, food for work, and other social and economic support and subsidies. Data would be disaggregated by relevant population groups.

Indicator 19: Number and percentage of cases of sexual violence against women and girls that are referred, investigated and sentenced

33. The level of investigation and prosecution of cases of sexual and gender-based violence remains low in many contexts. This indicator is an important measure of both access to justice for victims of sexual and gender-based violence and of accountability, in line with national legislation and international standards. This indicator focuses on sexual violence against women and girls. It is proposed to disaggregate this indicator into four components, including the total number of cases reported, investigated, referred and sentenced (all three expressed as a percentage of total number of cases of sexual violence reported). This indicator is responsive to paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 1325 (2000) and paragraph 3 of resolution 1820 (2008).

Indicator 20: Number and percentage of courts equipped to try cases of violations of women's and girls' human rights, with due attention to victims' security

34. It is known that women often do not report crimes committed against them, especially sexual and gender-based violence, for fear of stigmatization and retaliation. It is therefore important for mechanisms and laws to exist for protecting women and girls in such situations. Components of this indicator include the existence of mechanisms for witness protection; the existence of infrastructure and use of in-camera hearings; training of judges and prosecutors on women's and girls' rights and sexual and gender-based violence legislation. This indicator is in consonance with paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1325 (2000) and paragraph 4 of resolution 1820 (2008).

Relief and recovery

35. Indicators for this pillar assess the extent to which the specific needs of women and girls are addressed during the relief and recovery phase following conflict. The indicators respond to paragraphs 7 to 9, 13, 17 and 18 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 21 (a): Maternal mortality

36. This impact indicator is a proxy for women's access to reproductive health services during and after conflict. Accurately tracking maternal mortality is a challenging task which can be even more difficult in situations of conflict. Although it would be useful to have estimates pertaining to specific situations of conflict, reliable data are often available only at the national or regional level. This indicator is currently tracked under Millennium Development Goal 5, from which baseline data can be collected. This indicator is responsive to paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 21 (b): Primary and secondary education enrolment rates disaggregated by sex

37. There is considerable evidence supporting the empowering effect of education, even at the primary level. Education provides not only an ability to read and write but also the ability to access and use basic services and resources in a more efficient manner. It lays the foundation and provides the tools for women to pursue and assume active roles in peace processes. This indicator is responsive to paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 22: Extent to which strategic planning frameworks in conflict-affected countries incorporate gender analysis, targets, indicators and budgets

38. This indicator would track the level of inclusion of gender issues at four levels: analysis, target-setting, indicators and budgets. Particular attention will be paid to national planning frameworks with significant participation of the United Nations system, such as post-conflict needs assessments, consolidated appeal processes, common country assessments, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, integrated strategic frameworks, and integrated mission planning processes. Other important national-level planning frameworks to consider are poverty reduction strategy papers, national recovery plans, and national action plans. This indicator is responsive to paragraphs 7, 17 and 18 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 23: Proportion of the allocated and disbursed funding to civil society organizations, including women's groups, that is spent on gender issues in conflict-affected countries

39. Indicators 23 and 24 track the availability of funding to support gender programming in conflict-affected countries. For indicator 23, the proportion of allocated and disbursed funding that civil society organizations and women's groups devote to gender issues in conflict-affected countries would be disaggregated by sector of intervention and recipient. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 8 of resolution 1325 (2000) and paragraph 13 of resolution 1820 (2008).

Indicator 24: Actual allocated and disbursed funding in support of programmes that address gender sensitive relief, recovery, peace and security programmes in conflict-affected countries

40. There is an urgent need to track how much is being spent on addressing gender issues in conflict-affected countries. This indicator seeks to determine and track this — in terms of both allocations and disbursements. The data would be disaggregated to reflect, among others, funding through United Nations entities, other international organizations, bilateral donors and national Governments. The data would also be disaggregated by the sector of intervention, the recipient (national Governments, civil society organizations, etc.) and level of inclusion of gender issues. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 8 of resolution 1325 (2000) and paragraph 13 of resolution 1820 (2008).

Indicator 25 (a): Number and percentage of transitional justice mechanisms called for by peace processes that include provisions to address the rights and participation of women and girls in their mandates

41. It is of particular importance for the successful implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) that the rights and participation of women and girls are addressed early in the transition to peace. This indicator seeks to assess the degree to which various transitional justice mechanisms, including truth commissions, reparation programmes, land dispute settlement commissions, gender justice and criminal prosecutions, address the rights and participation of women and girls in their mandate. Gender responsiveness will be assessed considering the provisions in place to ensure the inclusion of women and girls in the process, the number and percentage of women and girls receiving benefits or services provided and the number and percentage of women at a senior level in each mechanism. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 8 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 25 (b): Number and percentage of women and girls receiving benefits through reparation programmes, and types of benefits received

42. This indicator gives a sense of women's and girls' empowerment in the context of conflict. It is known that women and girls are often excluded or only partially covered by the benefits that are provided by reparation programmes. Both indicators 25 (a) and 25 (b) track the gender responsiveness of post-conflict institutions and the processes of transitional justice, reconciliation and reconstruction. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 8 of resolution 1325 (2000).

Indicator 26: Number and percentage of female ex-combatants, women and girls associated with armed forces or groups that receive benefits from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes

43. Armed conflict affects women and men differently, and the needs of women and girls are often overlooked. It is therefore imperative for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to address the specific needs of all women and girls associated with armed forces and militias. The data would be disaggregated by different types of services such as housing, sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial care, vocational training, schooling, food and cash allowances. This indicator is responsive to paragraph 13 of resolution 1325 (2000) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1820 (2008).

V. Making the selected indicators operational

44. Once established, the indicators proposed in this report would provide a valuable database for assessing progress and challenges in implementing Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). A number of the indicators are currently in use and could be readily applied in the monitoring process. Those indicators labelled group A in the last column of tables 1 to 4 would require minimum or no testing or piloting before being made operational.

45. Group B indicators would require changes in the reporting system within United Nations entities. The data covered by this group are either currently not being collected or require a more regular process of collation and publication.

46. Indicators in groups C to F require more extensive processes before they can become available, group F being the most challenging set of indicators to compile. For that group, which includes two indicators, surveys or other direct data-collection procedures and specialized, careful technical and conceptual development would be required.

47. For all indicators other than those in group A, a pilot phase entailing further technical development, preliminary data collection and testing is required. It is expected that the length of the pilot phase would vary for each group of indicators, extending in some cases from two to five years.

48. The pilot phase would be an opportunity to develop the indicators and to work with Member States, United Nations country teams, civil society organizations and other stakeholders to establish ownership of the process and the outcomes.

49. An important step in making these indicators operational is the establishment of a baseline against which progress can be measured. Several United Nations entities have signalled a readiness to lead the measurement of a number of indicators and thus would guide the establishment of appropriate baselines.

50. A prerequisite for making the indicators operational is the availability of resources. The indicators have been selected with a view to building on the work of United Nations entities in this area in order to maximize efficiency. However, even where data already exist, resources would be required to collect, evaluate and report them on a routine basis. The commitment of various United Nations entities to track a number of the indicators suggests a willingness to adapt monitoring systems to this purpose.

51. It is clear that the proposed indicators cover areas that could be monitored by the United Nations system and others that could be monitored by Member States. It would be important that relevant stakeholders take responsibility for the development, evaluation and reporting of the indicators.

52. While most of the indicators have been proposed for countries or areas affected by conflict, in applying the indicators it would be important to be guided by the specific nature of the conflict situation. It is also important to note that the issues addressed in resolution 1325 (2000) are relevant for contexts that have not experienced armed conflict. Applicable indicators among those presented in this report can be used in those contexts also, to serve as early warning indicators.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

53. Ten years after its adoption, the overall implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) remains slow, and the assessment of the progress of the implementation is constrained by an absence of baseline data and specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound indicators. The Security Council's request for the development of a set of indicators for use at the global level to track the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) is therefore timely.

54. The indicators proposed in this report reflect the outcome of an extensive mapping and a comprehensive consultative process. To make operational the set of indicators proposed in this report a pilot phase entailing technical and baseline development and data collection would be needed. The involvement of United Nations country teams would be critical. The period of piloting would vary, depending on the indicator, from two to five years and would engage all stakeholders including Member States, United Nations entities, regional institutions and civil society organizations.

55. The process of preparing the indicators has created a strong momentum to move forward and has prepared entities to take ownership of the outcome. Principals of United Nations entities have indicated, for example, a readiness to collect and monitor some of the indicators.

56. It is recommended that the Council:

(a) Urge the United Nations system to engage relevant organizations and parties that have technical expertise in data collection and analysis to populate these indicators in the shortest possible time, so that the data would be available for use by all stakeholders, including Member States. In this respect, the relevant United Nations entities at the country level, such as the United Nations country teams, One United Nations pilots, and integrated missions, would play a lead role in testing and piloting indicators for national-level data;

(b) Request the inclusion of the information generated through these indicators, where possible, in the Secretary-General's country reports to the Security Council;

(c) Urge Member States, in parallel with United Nations efforts, to volunteer to pilot the indicators in order to ensure that they are relevant to specific country situations and to establish best practices in data collection and analysis;

(d) Bring these indicators to the attention of Member States that are developing national action plans with a view to incorporating them in measuring progress in implementation;

(e) Strengthen its accountability and monitoring of the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) through the establishment of a mechanism which would use the indicators provided in the present report;

(f) Urge Member States, in the context of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), to begin to use the proposed indicators for which data already exist, without prejudice to the continuing use of those indicators that they are currently employing in their work on resolution 1325 (2000).

57. In considering this report, the Council may wish to take note of the parallel ongoing work to develop indicators with regard to resolutions 1820 (2008), 1882 (2009), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1894 (2009).

Explanatory notes for tables

Group A: Available information exists and is collected through processes of which the United Nations system is part.

Group B: Information is collected and should be available through existing United Nations system processes and programmes, but there is no mandate for it to be published regularly.

Group C: Information is available from existing and easily accessible documents (through desk review), but these need to be collected and systematically analysed.

Group D: Available information is collated through systematic analysis, but the documents to be collated are not necessarily accessible.

Group E: Measurement will require system-wide changes to track the necessary information.

Group F: Requires direct data collection and specialized and careful technical and conceptual development.

Table 1
Proposed indicators: prevention

Type of indicator	*Indicator cluster*	*Specific consideration/criteria*	*Feasibility indicator group*
Goal	**Prevention of all forms of violence against women, particularly sexual and gender-based violence**		
Impact	**Indicator 1**: Incidence of sexual violence in conflict-affected countries[a]	Data on this indicator are expected to be collected through consistent, replicable and ethical surveys, to be disaggregated by: • Types of sexual violence • Relevant vulnerable groups (internally displaced persons, returnees, refugees)	F
Goal	**Operational gender-responsive systems in place to monitor, report and respond on violations of women's and girls' rights during conflict, ceasefires, peace negotiations and after conflict**		
Output	**Indicator 2**: Extent to which United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions include information on violations of women's and girls' human rights in their periodic reporting	To include: • Identification of cases of violations of women's and girls' human rights • Responses to identified cases	C
Output	**Indicator 3 (a)**: Number of violations of women's and girls' human rights that are reported, referred and investigated by human rights bodies **Indicator 3 (b)**: Inclusion of representatives of women's and civil society organizations in the governance and leadership of human rights bodies	Indicator has three components, each of which measures a different dimension of the functions of and reporting to human rights bodies. Data for specific human rights bodies could be identified.	C
Goal	**International, national and non-State security actors are responsive to and held to account for any violations of the rights of women and girls, in line with international standards**		
	Indicator 4: Percentage of reported cases of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by uniformed and civilian peacekeepers and humanitarian workers that are referred, investigated and acted upon	Disaggregated by: • Type of case reported (uniformed peacekeeper, civilian peacekeeper, humanitarian worker) • Types of actions taken (including disciplinary actions such as repatriation)	A

Type of indicator	*Indicator cluster*	*Specific consideration criteria*	*Feasibility indicator group*
	Indicator 5 (a): Number and percentage of directives for peacekeepers issued by heads of military components and standard operating procedures that include measures to protect women's and girls' human rights	These indicators capture the adequacy of information provided to uniformed and civilian peacekeepers, as well as military and civilian police personnel. The indicators are interrelated, but refer to either peacekeepers or national security forces. Data should indicate types of measures included.	C
Output	**Indicator 5 (b)**: Number and percentage of military manuals, national security policy frameworks, codes of conduct and standard operating procedures/ protocols of national security forces that include measures to protect women's and girls' human rights		D
Goal	**Provisions addressing the specific needs and issues of women and girls are included in early warning systems and conflict prevention mechanisms and their implementation is monitored**		
Output	**Indicator 6**: Number and type of actions taken by the Security Council related to resolution 1325 (2000), including those that prevent and address violations of the human rights of women and girls in conflict-affected situations	Actions to be considered include: call for report, request assessment, set up a specific mechanism, and mandate peacekeeping operations.	C
Output	**Indicator 7**: Number and proportion of women in decision-making roles in relevant regional organizations involved in preventing conflict	Data to be disaggregated by organization identified.[b]	B

[a] Incidence measures the number of cases of sexual violence that have occurred in a specific time period (in a specific population) relative to total size of the population at risk. This is distinct from both the number of cases reported in that period (which depends on victims officially reporting the crime) and prevalence (which measures the percentage of persons at risk in a particular population group who have been victims of sexual violence in their lifetime). It is also worth notice that, on 19 December 2006, the General Assembly adopted without a vote a resolution entitled "Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women" (resolution 61/143), in which it called for a set of possible indicators on violence against women to assist States in assessing the scope, prevalence and incidence of violence against women. As a consequence of that request, an Expert Group Meeting on indicators to measure violence against women was organized in October 2007. Technical development of this indicator should draw on this existing process.

[b] Regional organizations identified can include: African Union; Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Caribbean Community; Commonwealth of Independent States; Commonwealth Secretariat; Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries; Council of Europe; Economic Community of Central African States; Economic Community of West African States; European Union; Intergovernmental Authority for Development; International Organization of la Francophonie; League of Arab States; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Organization of American States; Organization of the Islamic Conference; Pacific Islands Forum; Shanghai Cooperation Organization; South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; Southern African Development Community.

Table 2
Proposed indicators: participation

Type of indicator	*Indicator/cluster*	*Specific consideration/criteria*	*Evaluation methodology group*
Goal	**Inclusion of women and women's interests in decision-making processes related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts**		
Impact	**Indicator 8**: Number and percentage of peace agreements with specific provisions to improve the security and status of women and girls	Specific provisions to be identified in the following areas: • Ceasefire agreements • Resolving border disputes • Security and demilitarization • Refugee return • Linguistic minorities • Human rights and fundamental freedoms • Economic restructuring • Elections • Transitional agreements • Constitutional agreements • Peacekeeping operations • Trust funds	C
Goal	**Increased representation and meaningful participation of women in United Nations and other international missions related to peace and security**		
Outcome	**Indicator 9**: Number and percentage of women in senior United Nations decision-making positions in conflict-affected countries	To include: • Number and percentage of women appointed to senior positions at the United Nations (special and personal representatives, envoys, heads of mission, resident coordinators) • Number and percentage of female uniformed and civilian peacekeeping personnel in decision-making positions (at Colonel or P-5 level and higher) • Number and percentage of female Professional staff across United Nations system (at P-5 level and higher)	A

Type of indicator	*Indicator cluster*	*Specific consideration/criteria*	*Feasibility indicator group*
Output	**Indicator 10**: Level of gender expertise in United Nations decision-making in conflict-affected countries	To include number and percentage of appointed gender advisers (at P-5 level and higher) in: • Mediation teams • Post-conflict needs assessment processes • Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes	B
Goal	**Increased representation and meaningful participation of women in formal and informal peace negotiations and peacebuilding processes**		
Outcome	**Indicator 11 (a)**: Level of participation of women in formal peace negotiations	To include: • Number and percentage of female mediators • Number and percentage of female negotiators	B
Outcome	**Indicator 11 (b)**: Presence of women in a formal observer of consultative status at the beginning and the end of peace negotiations	• To include whether women's civil society groups were present are the beginning and end of negotiations.	B
Goal	**Increased representation and meaningful participation of women in national and local governance, as citizens, elected officials and decision makers**		
Outcome	**Indicator 12**: Level of women's political participation in conflict-affected countries	To include: • Percentage of eligible women who are registered to vote • Percentage of women registered to vote who actually vote • Percentage of women parliamentary candidates • Percentage of women in parliaments • Percentage of women in ministerial positions	A
Goal	**Increased participation of women and women's organizations in activities to prevent, manage, resolve and respond to conflict and violations of women's and girls' human rights**		
Output	**Indicator 13**: Number and percentage of Security Council missions that address specific issues affecting women and girls in their terms of reference and the mission reports	Specific gender dimensions would be identified in both terms of reference and mission reports. Efforts would be made to identify specific issues and needs affecting women and girls.	C

Table 3
Proposed indicators: protection

Type of indicator	*Indicator/cluster*	*Specific consideration/criteria*	*Feasibility indicator group*
Goal	**Safety, physical and mental health of women and girls and their economic security are assured and their human rights respected**		
Impact	**Indicator 14**: Index of women's and girls' physical security	Data on this indicator are expected to be collected through consistent, replicable and ethical surveys,[a] to include: • Variables measuring women's and girls' perceptions of their physical security • Proxy variables measuring how women's and girls' ability to participate in public life (from those related to livelihoods to voting) has been affected • Proxy variables measuring how women's and girls' regular activities (collecting firewood and water, sending girls to school) have been affected Data should be disaggregated by relevant vulnerable groups (such as internally displaced populations).	F
Goal	**Political, economic, social and cultural rights of women and girls are protected and enforced by national laws in line with international standards**		
Outcome	**Indicator 15**: Extent to which national laws protect women's and girls' human rights in line with international standards	National laws include constitutions, penal and civil codes, and others applicable. Specific areas of concern are: • Inheritance rights (including land, property and citizenship) • Criminalization of gender-based violence[b] • Minimum marriage age and forced marriage	D
Goal	**Operational mechanisms and structures in place for strengthening physical security and safety for women and girls**		
Output	**Indicator 16**: Level of women's participation in the justice and security sector in conflict-affected countries	To include: • Percentage of women in military, armed and security services, disaggregated by rank • Percentage of women in police, disaggregated by rank	D

Type of indicator	*Indicator cluster*	*Specific consideration/criteria*	*Feasibility indicator group*
		• Percentage of women in judiciary, disaggregated at all levels (to include traditional courts where relevant)	
Output	**Indicator 17**: Existence of national mechanisms for control of small arms and light weapons[c]	Control mechanisms to be assessed considering: • Existence of a national coordination agency on small arms and light weapons • Number and types of small arms and light weapons available per 10,000 population	B
Goal	**Women and girls at risk have access to livelihood support services**		
Output	**Indicator 18**: Women as a percentage of the adults employed in early economic recovery programmes	Indicate percentage of women recipients (out of total) disaggregated by: • Vulnerable groups (victims of sexual and gender-based violence, internally displaced persons, etc.) • Type of employment scheme and estimation of associated payments	B
Goal	**Increased access to justice for women whose rights are violated**		
Outcome	**Indicator 19**: Number and percentage of cases of sexual violence against women and girls that are referred, investigated and sentenced	To include: • Total number of cases reported • Cases investigated (as percentage of total of cases of sexual violence against women and girls reported) • Cases referred (as percentage of total of cases of sexual violence against women and girls reported) • Cases sentenced (as percentage of total of cases of sexual violence against women and girls reported)	E
Output	**Indicator 20**: Number and percentage of courts equipped to try cases of violations of women's and girls' human rights, with due attention to victims' security	Courts to be assessed considering: • Existence of mechanisms for witness protection • Existence of infrastructure and use of in-camera hearings Training of judges and prosecutors on women's and girls' rights and legislation on sexual and gender-based violence	D

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to Table 3)

[a] The World Bank is currently exploring the option of using Gallup perception surveys to report on a similar index, to be included in the forthcoming World Development Report 2011 on post-conflict and fragile States.

[b] The tracking of sexual violence legislation is currently covered within the indicators developed to ensure monitoring and reporting of resolution 1820, as called for in resolution 1888 (2009), para. 26.

[c] Under the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, every Member State has committed itself to establish a national coordination agency on small arms; make illicit gun production/possession a criminal offence, and keep track of officially held guns. In addition, information on the existence and operation of national control mechanisms of small arms and light weapons is monitored by the Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism.

Table 4
Proposed indicators: relief and recovery

Type of indicator	*Indicator cluster*	*Specific consideration/criteria*	*Feasibility indicator gro*
Goal	**Women's and girls' specific reproductive health needs are met in conflict and post-conflict situations**		
Impact	**Indicator 21 (a)**: Maternal mortality	Maternal mortality is an important proxy for women's access to reproductive health services during and after conflict, as well as an indicator of their overall well-being. This indicator is currently tracked under Millennium Development Goal 5, for which we can refer to baselines and target setting.	A
Impact	**Indicator 21 (b)**: Primary and secondary education enrolment rates disaggregated by sex	There is considerable evidence supporting the empowering effect of education even at the primary level. Education provides not only an ability to read and write but also to access and use basic social services in a more efficient manner.	A
Goal	**The needs of women and girls, especially vulnerable groups (internally displaced persons, victims of sexual and gender-based violence, ex-combatants, refugees, returnees) are addressed in relief, early recovery and economic recovery programmes**		
Output	**Indicator 22**: Extent to which strategic planning frameworks in conflict-affected countries incorporate gender analysis, targets, indicators and budgets	Disaggregated by level of inclusion of gender issues in: • Analysis • Targets • Indicators • Budgets Types of planning frameworks to be included: • United Nations-led: post-conflict needs assessments, consolidated appeal processes, common country assessments, United Nations Development Assistance Framework, integrated strategic frameworks, integrated mission planning processes • National: poverty reduction strategy papers, national recovery plans, national action plans	C

Type of indicator	*Indicator cluster*	*Specific considerations (criteria)*	*Feasibility indicator group*
Output	**Indicator 23**: Proportion of the allocated and disbursed funding to civil society organizations, including women's groups, that is spent on gender issues in conflict-affected countries	Disaggregated by: • Sector of intervention • Recipient (women's groups, other civil society organizations)	E
Output	**Indicator 24**: Actual allocated and disbursed funding in support of programmes that address gender sensitive relief, recovery, peace and security programmes in conflict-affected countries	To include: • Funding through United Nations entities, including special funds such as the UNDP Bureau for Crime Prevention and Recovery Trust Fund, Central Emergency Response Fund, common humanitarian funds, United Nations-managed multi-donor trust funds • Funding from other international organizations and their special funds, such as the World Bank Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund, multi-donor trust funds (not managed by United Nations), European Union instrument for stability • Funding from bilateral donors (drawing from OECD/DAC, but other sources could be added) • Funding from national Governments (to the extent to which it is available) Disaggregated by: • Sector of intervention • Recipient (national Government, civil society organizations, etc.) • Level of inclusion of gender issues (in line with gender marker systems in use)[a]	E
Goal	**Post-conflict institutions and processes of transitional justice, reconciliation and reconstruction are gender-responsive**		
Outcome	**Indicator 25 (a)**: Number and percentage of transitional justice mechanisms called for by peace processes that include provisions to address the rights and participation of women and girls in their mandates	Types of mechanisms include: • Truth commissions • Reparation programmes • Gender justice • Criminal prosecutions	D

Type of indicator	Indicator cluster	Specific consideration/criteria	Feasibility indicator group
		Each of these mechanisms should be assessed considering:	
		• The mandate includes protocols for the inclusion of women and girls in the process[b]	
		• Number and percentage of women and girls receiving benefits or services provided, or participating in post-conflict processes that are put in place[c]	
		• Number and percentage of women at senior level in each mechanism	
Output	**Indicator 25 (b)**: Number and percentage of women and girls receiving benefits through reparation programmes, and types of benefits received	To be disaggregated by different types of services	B
Goal	**Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform programmes address the specific security and other needs of female security actors, ex-combatants, and women and girls associated with armed groups**		
Output	**Indicator 26**: Number and percentage of female ex-combatants, women and girls associated with armed forces or groups that receive benefits from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes	Indicate percentage of female recipients (out of total) disaggregated by different types of services, such as:	B
		• Housing	
		• Sexual and reproductive health	
		• Psychosocial care	
		• Vocational training	
		• Schooling	
		• Food	
		• Cash allowances	

[a] An example is the gender marker system used by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Sub-Working Group, which goes from 0 to 3. Value 3 is assigned if the principal purpose of the project is to advance gender equality. Value 2 is assigned if the project is designed to contribute significantly to gender equality; it includes an analysis of the different needs of women/girls and men/boys and it has been integrated well in the activities and outcomes. Value 1 is assigned to projects where women are mentioned explicitly in the objectives but do not include specific activities or reserved budgets; gender issues are mentioned but addressed in a limited way and the design could be stronger and advance gender equality more. Value 0 is assigned to projects that do not specifically mention women or show no sign that gender issues were considered in project design. As with all markers, there is a risk that the project will unknowingly nurture existing gender inequalities or deepen them.

[b] Such as protection of female witnesses in truth commission hearings; and reparations schemes that include conflict-related violations of women's and girls' human rights.

[c] Such as percentage of female victims receiving reparations and type of reparations received; and percentage of female witnesses participating in truth commission hearings.

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Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Prevention of armed conflict

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 2 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the military forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, recorded for the period of 1 March to 1 April 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 13, 14 and 18, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-30555 (E) 120410

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Annex to the letter dated 2 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 March to 1 April 2010

N	(Direction)	Date, time	Firing	
			From Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
	Chinari	01.03.10 13.15	SVD	1
	Chinari	01.03.10 16.15	12.7 Machinegun	2
	Chinari	01.03.10 19.00	12.7 Machinegun	15
	Aygedzor	01.03.10 20.30	Firearm	10
	Vazashen	01.03.10 23.25	Firearm	20
	Vahan	02.03.10 21.20	Firearm	30
	Sovetkend	02.03.10 21.40	7.62 Machinegun 12.7 Machinegun Firearm	500 100 150
	Ajgepar	02.03.10 10.50	Firearm	2
	Ajgepar	02.03.10 11.30	Firearm	2
	Ajgepar	02.03.10 11.50	Firearm	4
	Ajgepar	02.03.10 14.00	Firearm	10
	Ajgepar	02.03.10 17.25	Firearm	1
	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	02.03.10 22.45	7.62 Machinegun	4

	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	03.03.10 01.00	Firearm	3
	Dovekh	02.03.10 13.40	SVD	3
	Berqaber	02.03.10 19.10	7.62 Machinegun	15
	Paravaqar	02.03.10 20.00	SVD	1
	Ajgehovit	03.03.10 00.10	Firearm	3
	Laligyugh	03.03.10 02.40	SVD	3
	Chinari	02.03.10 21.25	Firearm	4
	Bardzruni	02.03.10 15.05	Firearm	1
	Bardzruni	02.03.10 18.30	Firearm	7
	Bardzruni	02.03.10 18.50	Firearm	5
	Berdavan	04.03.10 18.40	SVD	3
	Movses	04.03.10 19.15	Firearm	4
	Vazashen	04.03.10 23.20	Firearm 7.62 Machinegun	1 2
	Vazashen	05.03.10 01.30	7.62 Machinegun	5
	Khndzorut	04.03.10 17.40	Firearm	7
	Movses	05.03.10 09.40	Firearm	2
	Chinari	05.03.10 19.00	SVD	1
	Kirants	06.03.10 02.10	7.62 Machinegun	5

	Khndzorut	05.03.10 06.30	Firearm	6
	Khndzorut	05.03.10 22.10	Firearm	3
	Barekamavan	06.03.10 17.00	Firearm	5
	Bardzruni	06.03.10 15.55	Firearm	1
	Khndzorut	06.03.10 22.40	Firearm	1
	Chinari	08.03.10 18.20	Firearm	3
	Paravaqar	08.03.10 23.30	Firearm	14
	Voskepar	09.03.10 14.15	Firearm	2
	Chinari	09.03.10 23.40	Firearm	35
	Bakhanis	10.03.10 00.15	7.62 Machinegun	30
	Movses	10.03.10 11.00	Firearm	3
	Movses	10.03.10 11.35	Firearm	8
	Movses	10.03.10 14.00	Firearm	3
	Laligyugh	11.03.10 23.30	Firearm	20
	Chinari	12.03.10 15.30	Firearm	5
	Berqaber	13.03.10 11.20	Firearm	3
	Kayanavan	14.03.10 16.40	Firearm	10
	Koti	15.03.10 12.40	Firearm 5.45 Machinegun	6 4
	Berdavan	15.03.10 13.25	Firearm	8

	Chinari	17.03.10 00.40	Firearm 7.62 Machinegun	100 120
	Koti	17.03.10 10.30	Firearm	13
	Movses	17.03.10 13.30	Firearm	1
	Chinari	17.03.10 18.00	12.7 Machinegun	5
	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	18.03.10 08.40	Firearm	10
	Koti	18.03.10 15.25	Firearm 7.62 Machinegun	15 15
	Koti	18.03.10 15.25	Firearm	15
	Ajgepar	18.03.10 17.25	Firearm	4
	Ajgepar	18.03.10 19.00	Firearm	3
	Khndzorut	18.03.10 16.00	Firearm	5
	Khndzorut	18.03.10 16.30	Firearm	3
	Jokhaj	22.03.10 05.55	Firearm	1
	Jokhaj	22.03.10 06.05	Firearm	2
	Ajgepar	22.03.10 13.00	Firearm	2
	Ajgepar	22.03.10 14.40	Firearm	8
	Chinari	23.03.10 14.50	SVD	2
	Khndzorut	23.03.10 11.15	Firearm	2
	Movses	24.03.10 20.30	Firearm	1
	Chinari	25.03.10 13.40	SVD	9

	Bardzruni	26.03.10 09.40	Firearm	20
	Barekamavan	27.03.10 18.20	Firearm	12
	Berdavan	27.03.10 19.40	Firearm	5
	Ajgepar	28.03.10 15.20	Firearm	6
	Dovegh	28.03.10 12.20	Firearm	7
	Dovegh	28.03.10 16.50	Firearm	25
	Chinari	28.03.10 16.20	Firearm SVD 12.7 Machinegun	6 8 2
	Chinari	28.03.10 18.00	SVD 7.62 Machinegun	20 25
	Barekamavan	30.03.10 03.40	Firearm	4
	Ajgepar	30.03.10 12.35	Firearm	3
	Movses	30.03.10 17.00	Firearm	3
	Chinari	30.03.10 15.05	7.62 Machinegun	40
	Chinari	30.03.10 23.00	Firearm SVD 7.62 Machinegun	30 10 7
	Chinari	30.03.10 23.10	Firearm SVD	20 6
	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	31.03.10 11.00	Firearm	3
	Ajgepar	31.03.10 19.30	Firearm	15
	Khndzorut	31.03.10 08.40	Firearm	2

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline with the Republic of Armenia from 1 March to 1 April 2010:

Number of violations — 86

Shots — about 1711 (PK ~ 768, RPK ~ 4, SVD- 67, machine gun 12.7mm ~ 124, AK ~ 748).

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic from 1 March to 1 April 2010:

Number of violations — 378

Shots — about 2559 (PK ~ 177, SVD- 256, machine gun 12.7mm ~ 50, AK ~ 2076).

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1871 (2009) of 30 April 2009, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2010 and requested me to provide a report on the situation before that date. The present report covers developments since the issuance of my previous report dated 13 April 2009 (S/2009/200).

II. Recent developments in Western Sahara

2. The Territory remained largely calm during the period under review. King Mohammed VI of Morocco made a speech on the occasion of the thirty-fourth anniversary of the "Green March", on 6 November, in which he proposed a five-point plan towards "regionalization", to be focused initially on the part of Western Sahara controlled by Morocco. He reaffirmed the commitment of the Kingdom to its autonomy proposal as presented in the negotiations being held under the auspices of the United Nations. In a letter dated 9 November addressed to me, the Secretary-General of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro (Frente Polisario), Mohamed Abdelaziz, referring to the speech made by the King of Morocco, reiterated his position that the Saharan people should decide their future by means of a free referendum.

3. The Frente Polisario commemorated the thirty-fourth anniversary of the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" from 26 to 28 February. Celebrations took place in various locations in the Territory (east of the berm, controlled by the Frente Polisario) and in the Tindouf, Algeria, refugee camps. About 500 people gathered in Bir Lahlou, in the north-eastern part of the Territory, for the main ceremony. The same week, the Frente Polisario "National Council" put forward the "exercise of sovereignty of the Sahrawi State, the repopulation of the liberated territories, the strengthening of the Sahrawi People's Liberation Army and support for the independence intifada in the occupied territories of Western Sahara" as its priorities for 2010. In May, the Frente Polisario launched its new television channel.

4. Approximately 600 people participated in the "Thousand-person march", a demonstration organized on 10 April by the Frente Polisario and non-governmental

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organizations sympathetic to its cause. During the demonstration, a 19-year-old Saharan stepped on an anti-personnel landmine east of the berm and lost a foot as he and several other young men protested close to the mined berm. The Frente Polisario urged me, in a letter dated 12 April, to obtain the demolition of the berm for humanitarian reasons.

5. Two incidents that occurred in May affected United Nations premises in the Mission area. On 23 May, a Saharan woman declared a hunger strike inside a small compound of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) within the Tindouf refugee camps. After a few days, local elders persuaded her to desist, and she left the compound. Meanwhile, in an apparently unrelated action, three Saharan men entered team site Smara (west of the berm) uninvited on 25 May and displayed banners with demands relating to Saharan political prisoners. MINURSO officials persuaded them to leave quietly the same evening.

6. On 30 November, the Frente Polisario informed MINURSO that Mauritania was conducting air reconnaissance operations near Agwanit, in the south-eastern part of the Territory controlled by the Frente Polisario, in pursuit of an unidentified group that had reportedly abducted three Spanish nationals in Mauritania. MINURSO suspended all ground patrols east of the berm and instructed all team sites in that area to seal their entrances. On the basis of information provided by the Frente Polisario to the effect that the criminal group was not present in Western Sahara but was reported to be near Mali, MINURSO resumed its normal patrolling activities east of the berm on 8 December.

7. On 14 November, the Moroccan authorities detained prominent Saharan activist Aminatou Haidar at Laayoune airport as she returned from a trip to the United States of America. She was subsequently expelled to Spain's Canary Islands nearby. The case of Ms. Haidar was resolved after a 32-day hunger strike, when she was allowed to return to her family in Laayoune (see para. 64 below).

8. During Ms. Haidar's hunger strike, increased tension was noted in the Tindouf camps. On 11 December, a group of young Saharan men penetrated the small UNHCR compound, caused minor material damage and briefly raised the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" flag in place of UNHCR's. The group was later persuaded to remove its flag and leave the compound peacefully. Following the incident, and at the request of MINURSO and other United Nations agencies operating in the area, the Frente Polisario temporarily posted security guards at the UNHCR compound until tension subsided.

III. Activities of my Personal Envoy

A. Contacts with the parties and the first informal meeting

9. In March 2009, my Personal Envoy, Mr. Christopher Ross, began consultations in New York on the holding of one or more informal meetings of the parties and neighbouring States to prepare for a fifth round of negotiations, and the Security Council, in its resolution 1871 (2009), welcomed that approach.

10. The results of those consultations required him to travel to the region for a second time, from 22 June to 1 July, to clarify the purpose and structure of the

informal meetings and to confirm the readiness to attend of the parties and neighbouring States. During his trip, Mr. Ross met with the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika; the Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario, Mr. Abdelaziz; the Prime Minister, Yahya Ould Ahmed El Waghef, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, of Mauritania; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco, Taïb Fassi-Fihri, as well as with members of their respective teams. All interlocutors reaffirmed their commitment to continue working with the United Nations to find a solution, and an agreement was reached on a first informal meeting, for which the Government of Austria generously offered a venue. During and after that trip, my Personal Envoy also consulted with senior officials in France, Spain and the United States of America.

11. The first informal meeting was held in Dürnstein, Austria, on 9 and 10 August, and achieved its principal objective of re-establishing the atmosphere of mutual respect and dialogue that had reigned at the beginning of the negotiations in Manhasset, but had collapsed in the course of successive rounds. The parties engaged with one another in a respectful manner and in a spirit of extensive give and take, discussing confidence-building measures and human rights issues as a prelude to a later examination of the core issues of their dispute. They concurred that a long-standing agreement in principle to explore the road option in the context of an expansion of family visits between Western Sahara and the refugee camps should be implemented, and they agreed to consider in a positive spirit confidence-building measures that the High Commissioner for Refugees had proposed and others that my Personal Envoy might put forth.

12. With regard to human rights issues, the parties exchanged accusations of violations, and each complained about how the other approached such matters. The Frente Polisario called for a United Nations monitoring mechanism, and Morocco expressed its opposition. My Personal Envoy proposed that, to avoid poisoning the atmosphere, the parties communicate their concerns on this issue through him instead of by means of public communications. Despite apparent agreement on that procedure, public accusations continued thereafter. Before the meeting ended, the parties also engaged in a preliminary discussion of core substantive issues but continued to disagree, in particular on the requirements of self-determination.

13. Observer delegations from Algeria and Mauritania were present in Dürnstein. Of note was the fact that, for the first time since 2004, Algeria participated in the process at the ministerial level. The delegation of Algeria stated that, as an observer delegation, it could not participate directly in the talks but was ready to work with the parties on anything to which they agreed as regards confidence-building measures and human rights issues.

B. Further contacts with the parties and renewed tension

14. After the Dürnstein meeting, my Personal Envoy consulted regularly with the parties and determined that progress on the core substantive issues was most likely to emerge at a further informal meeting rather than at an immediate fifth round of formal negotiations. In September, in the course of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, I met separately with President Bouteflika of Algeria and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco, Mr. Fassi-Fihri, and both expressed their continued commitment to the negotiating process and their support for the efforts of

my Personal Envoy. Further consultations with the parties opened the way to serious engagement with respect to their proposals of April 2007. On that basis, my Personal Envoy proposed that a second informal meeting be held on 21 and 22 November or on 4 and 5 December 2009.

15. However, beginning in October, a series of events made it increasingly impossible to meet on the proposed dates. Each party engaged in actions that the other deemed provocative and destructive of the positive atmosphere that had emerged in Dürnstein, and each questioned the good faith of the other. As those events unfolded, my Personal Envoy, as did a number of other international actors, found himself operating in crisis-management mode to prevent the situation from deteriorating any further.

C. Second informal meeting

16. By January 2010, the climate had improved, and my Personal Envoy was able to hold a second informal meeting in Westchester County, New York, on 10 and 11 February. As the meeting started, each party was provided the opportunity to make an opening statement. Most of the ensuing exchanges concerned human rights and related issues, and both parties complained of violations. Again, the Frente Polisario called for United Nations monitoring, and again Morocco stated its opposition. It also asserted that, by refraining from exercising their responsibility with respect to the refugees on Algerian territory, Algeria and UNHCR were not fulfilling their international obligations.

17. During the rest of the talks, each party again presented its proposal of April 2007 and, to varying degrees, engaged with regard to the proposal of the other. Although the exchanges were frank and respectful, at the end of the meeting both parties agreed with my Personal Envoy's summary that neither party had accepted the proposal of the other as the sole basis of future negotiations. It was clear to my Personal Envoy that the fundamental and, to date, non-negotiable difference between the two parties lies in the issue of self-determination. The Frente Polisario, with the support of Algeria, insists on a referendum with multiple options, including independence, while Morocco insists on a negotiated autonomy regime and a referendum of confirmation with one option.

18. As in Dürnstein, observer delegations from Algeria and Mauritania were present but did not participate directly in the talks. Algeria reiterated its support for anything to which the parties might agree and undertook to look into the reasons for the delay in opening telephone communication between Western Sahara and the most remote refugee camp, Dakhla, as foreseen in the confidence-building measures agreed earlier.

D. Next steps

19. During the informal talks, both parties reiterated their commitment to continuing negotiations as soon as possible. My Personal Envoy visited the region in March 2010 to solicit the parties' ideas on how to move beyond the present impasse, bearing in mind that neither party is prepared to accept the proposal of the other as written and that no mechanism exists to oblige the parties to agree to either proposal for resolving the dispute.

20. From the outset, my Personal Envoy has kept the Security Council and the Group of Friends fully informed of his activities through written communications and informal and formal briefings, the latest of which took place on 18 February 2010. His efforts to promote a settlement have been laborious. Their pace and substance have been heavily affected by the parties' reaction to events in the region and their unyielding attachment to mutually exclusive positions. Nonetheless, he continues to make intensive efforts to promote a mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. Such a solution is a prerequisite for the return of the refugees to their homes and the reinforcement of stability, development and integration in the region.

IV. Activities on the ground

A. Military

21. As at 20 March 2010, the military component of MINURSO stood at 223 personnel, including administrative personnel and medical unit officers, against the authorized strength of 230. MINURSO currently has five women military observers, from El Salvador, France, Ghana and Mongolia. There are also five women officers, including two doctors and three nurses, in the Malaysian medical unit. I would welcome further deployments of women officers by troop-contributing countries, both for operational reasons and to improve the Mission's gender balance. During the period under review, the average number of French-, Spanish- and Arabic-speaking military observers saw a substantial increase, from 14 to 19, from 25 to 28 and from 17 to 32, respectively.

22. In addition to the nine team sites and the Tindouf liaison office, two military observers have been deployed temporarily as liaison officers with the Royal Moroccan Army in Dakhla since 19 October. That deployment took place with a view to establishing a liaison platform between MINURSO and the sector command headquarters of the Royal Moroccan Army, following the 2005 closure of the MINURSO southern sector headquarters. This temporary arrangement is to be evaluated in July 2010 before a decision is made as to its prolongation.

23. During the period from 1 April 2009 to 20 March 2010, MINURSO performed 8,433 ground patrols and 578 aerial patrols (including air reconnaissance) to visit and monitor units of the Royal Moroccan Army and the military forces of the Frente Polisario and to monitor adherence to the military agreements. During that period, the Mission continued to make extensive use of helicopter patrols as an effective monitoring method, in combination with day and night ground patrolling.

24. MINURSO continues to enjoy good relations with the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente Polisario military forces. However, both sides continued to abstain from dealing directly with each other. All known contact between the two armed forces continued to take the form of written communications through MINURSO. The Mission has proposed the creation of a joint military verification mechanism to discuss allegations of violations of military agreement No. 1 and other issues of common interest.

25. MINURSO observed and recorded 24 new violations by the Royal Moroccan Army, an increase compared with the 11 recorded during the previous reporting period. Violations by the Royal Moroccan Army included the construction of new buildings and living accommodations in the Haouza, Mahbas, Awsard and Tichla areas without prior approval by MINURSO. The movement of troops and military assets on four separate occasions in October and December 2009 without prior notification of MINURSO also constitute violations of military agreement No. 1. Finally, the tactical reinforcement of the Royal Moroccan Army through the construction of a new airfield in the restricted area; the building of supportive stone walls along the berm, in two cases raising the height of the berm; the introduction of multi-purpose wheeled Atlas vehicles in three areas; and the replacement of a number of light tanks by heavier, longer-range ones (M-48) also contravene military agreement No. 1. In addition, the Royal Moroccan Army installed three new radar towers despite written notification by MINURSO that this would constitute a violation (see para. 28 below).

26. The Royal Moroccan Army has told MINURSO that certain violations are related to the enhancement of security in order to combat potential terrorist activities, as well as smuggling and trafficking, which have increased in the Sahel region.

27. MINURSO observed a total of five new violations by the Frente Polisario military force, a slight decrease compared to the seven recorded during the previous reporting period, in 2008-2009. Those violations were related mainly to the incursion of military elements, including some equipment, into the buffer strip.

28. There has been no change in the status of long-standing violations by both parties since my previous report. On 20 January, the Royal Moroccan Army sent a letter to the Force Commander regarding the proposed construction of three new, heightened towers for surveillance radar in the restricted area near Bir Gandouz. MINURSO rejected the request and reminded the Royal Moroccan Army that ground radar equipment deployed in the restricted area has been considered a "longstanding violation" since 2005. MINURSO insisted that the Royal Moroccan Army undertake all necessary corrective measures with respect to these violations.

29. During the period under review, the Royal Moroccan Army raised 20 allegations of violations of military agreement No. 1 against the Frente Polisario military forces, which, in turn, raised 10 allegations against the Moroccan forces. All allegations were communicated in writing to both parties by MINURSO.

30. Most of the allegations by the Royal Moroccan Army related to the buffer strip, specifically alleged incursions by Frente Polisario soldiers, movement of vehicles with uniformed personnel, construction of shelters and sounds of explosions inside the buffer strip. After investigation by MINURSO, none of the allegations by the Royal Moroccan Army could be confirmed owing to lack of evidence. Frente Polisario allegations against the Royal Moroccan Army related to the construction of a barbed-wire fence in the buffer strip, the construction of an airfield and a warehouse in the restricted area, the raising of the height of the berm, the digging of new anti-tank trenches, sounds of tank movements and explosions, reconnaissance overflights by unmanned aerial vehicles and the improving and reinforcing of the berm by mechanical means. After investigation by MINURSO, four Frente Polisario allegations were confirmed as violations: the placement of a 200-metre barbed-wire fence in the buffer strip, the construction of an airfield in the

restricted area, and the raising of the height of the berm through the construction of a new stone wall. Other allegations could not be confirmed owing to lack of evidence. Allegations of reconnaissance overflights by unmanned aerial vehicles could not be confirmed owing to the Mission's lack of technical capability.

31. Over the past year, restrictions on the freedom of movement of MINURSO military observers by both parties, in particular by the Royal Moroccan Army, decreased substantially. Only one freedom-of-movement violation was committed by the Royal Moroccan Army, on 22 September, when military observers from team site Smara were prevented from visiting the headquarters of the 4th garrison. No freedom-of-movement violations were committed by Frente Polisario forces, as compared with 75 such violations by the Royal Moroccan Army and two such violations by the Frente Polisario in the previous year. Since October 2009, MINURSO has not recorded any restriction on freedom of movement by the parties.

32. MINURSO received 276 requests from the Royal Moroccan Army regarding the construction of buildings and facilities used by military personnel and the maintenance and destruction of mines and explosive remnants of war. The Frente Polisario sent two construction requests during the period under review. All requests are reviewed by MINURSO.

33. During the period under review, MINURSO received 309 notifications from the Royal Moroccan Army concerning firing and tactical training exercises, movement of troops, equipment and tanks, VIP and maintenance flights, and the destruction of mines and explosive remnants of war. MINURSO received 16 notifications from the Frente Polisario forces regarding training and firing, exercises and visits. All the activities of which the Mission was notified during the period were monitored by MINURSO.

34. MINURSO continued to produce locust-monitoring reports, compiled by the team sites on a monthly basis. A total of 16 reports were sent to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for global monitoring purposes during the period under review.

B. Mine action

35. The widespread presence of landmines and explosive remnants of war throughout Western Sahara, including in areas where MINURSO military observers and logistical vehicles operate on a daily basis, continues to be a cause for serious concern. In response to this threat, the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre continued its efforts to develop and increase collaboration with the parties in accordance with military agreements Nos. 2 and 3. Coordinated efforts aimed at eradicating the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war have become more effective owing to the establishment of a substantiated database that more accurately reflects the currently known contamination of Western Sahara.

36. During the reporting period, the Mine Action Coordination Centre provided advice and assistance to the Royal Moroccan Army and to Landmine Action the international non-governmental organization contracted by the United Nations, on the Information Management System for Mine Action database. This has permitted coordination and technical assistance for the capturing and management of the data

and has allowed for better planning, resulting in the improved productivity and increased cost-effectiveness of clearance operations.

37. For the period from January to December 2009, Landmine Action cleared 2.9 million square metres of land of cluster munitions and unexploded ordnance. The Landmine Action programme has also made noteworthy strides in the promotion of gender mainstreaming in its operations and contributes to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). In that regard, Landmine Action has four Saharan women staff members trained and integrated into the field-based battle area clearance teams, as well as others throughout its field headquarters operations.

38. During the reporting period, mine action operations west of the berm by the Royal Moroccan Army, and east of the berm by Landmine Action, resulted in a substantial number of landmines and unexploded ordnance being destroyed, specifically 3,304 anti-tank mines, 407 anti-personnel mines and 12,952 items of unexploded ordnance and abandoned munitions.

39. In order to further enhance the safety of personnel and operations, MINURSO put in place an awareness-raising training programme aimed at establishing and promoting a safer working environment for United Nations personnel conducting operations in areas where landmines and explosive remnants of war pose a threat to their activities. That was achieved through the regular dissemination of new data relating to suspected hazardous areas, more systematic and intensive safety training, and maintenance of the capacity of the previously established emergency response team to assist with mine accidents east of the berm. As part of the programme, briefings on mine and explosive remnants of war safety were provided to 279 people, including 35 women; of the total, 251 were military and 28 were civilian staff.

40. In that regard, 15 mine accidents, resulting in two fatalities and 23 persons injured, were reported in 2009. While the overall accident figure represents a slight decrease from the 18 such accidents in 2008, the total number of victims has increased by three. The accidents were reported by a variety of sources, but mainly through military observers operating within their respective areas; it was possible, therefore, to verify all accidents. In the part of the Territory controlled by Morocco, 10 accidents were recorded, two fewer than in 2008. The number of accidents reported in the part of the Territory controlled by the Frente Polisario also reflected a slight decrease, from six in 2008 to five in 2009.

41. One of the accidents recorded west of the berm involved four United Nations military observers who were patrolling in close proximity to the berm, in an area controlled by Morocco, near a strongpoint of the Royal Moroccan Army, in the area of responsibility of MINURSO team site Oum Dreyga. One of the patrol vehicles detonated a landmine during a daytime patrol. Although the vehicle was damaged beyond economical repair, just one of the four United Nations military observers was injured, and only slightly. The accident represents the fourth mine accident that the Mission has experienced since its establishment in 1991. The fatalities and injuries reported highlight the continuing threat to life posed by mines and explosive remnants of war, in particular with respect to the nomadic population, and to peace and security within the Territory.

C. Persons unaccounted for in the conflict

42. The International Committee of the Red Cross continued to work with the parties and families concerned in pursuing the question of persons still unaccounted for in relation to the conflict.

D. Assistance to Western Saharan refugees

43. On 8 September, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. António Guterres, made a five-day visit to Algeria, Morocco and Western Sahara. In Algeria, he visited refugees from Western Sahara in the camps near Tindouf to witness first-hand that long-standing situation and to assess the overall condition of the refugees, including through conversations with them and their leaders. This was the first time since 1976 that a High Commissioner for Refugees had visited the camps. The trip, which took place during the month of Ramadan, was also intended as a strong demonstration of solidarity with the populations of the region. The High Commissioner's visit paved the way for a reorientation of the assistance programme in the camps through an increase in the level of assistance and an enhanced its focus on the long-term welfare of the refugees, with special attention to the areas of nutrition, health and education.

44. The High Commissioner also met with senior Government officials in both Rabat and Algiers to discuss substantive issues pertaining to the Western Saharan refugees in the camps. In those meetings, he emphasized the exclusively humanitarian nature of the UNHCR mandate. For their part, senior officials in both capitals reiterated to the High Commissioner their Governments' full cooperation with and support for UNHCR. The Moroccan authorities also emphasized the need to find a durable solution for the refugees. The High Commissioner urged the donor community in both countries to continue to support the Western Saharan refugee population.

45. UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) continued to provide assistance to the Western Saharan refugees in the camps near Tindouf, in partnership with the World Health Organization, the European Commission Humanitarian Office, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development and several international and local non-governmental organizations.

46. The High Commissioner discussed the issue of refugee registration with the authorities of both countries. Accurate statistics on the number of refugees in the Tindouf camps are not available. The Frente Polisario and the host Government estimate the number of refugees at 165,000. In the absence of registration, the UNHCR assistance programme is targeting the 90,000 most vulnerable persons among the refugee population. An additional 35,000 food rations are provided within the framework of WFP general food-distribution programmes, in an attempt to respond to pressing nutritional needs.

47. WFP continued to provide 125,000 monthly general feeding rations to the most vulnerable Western Saharan refugees, in addition to a school feeding programme and supplementary feeding support for malnourished children under 5 years of age, and for pregnant women and nursing mothers. Overall, in 2009 WFP distributed a total of 26,953 tons of food. UNHCR also provided complementary food, including 65.5 tons of tea and 27 tons of yeast, and conducted joint food monitoring with WFP

for the general food basket distribution. Finally, during the month of Ramadan, UNHCR provided 676 additional tons of fresh food. Furthermore, in 2009 UNHCR made considerable progress in combating the high levels of anaemia afflicting the refugee population, and laid the foundation for a comprehensive child health and nutrition programme and implementation strategy with all partners. A feasibility study confirmed the acceptability of the supplementary foods to the refugee population, which, in turn, allowed for the subsequent procurement of the products. Finally, WFP was successful in ensuring that the basic food basket was diversified to better meet the nutritional needs of the refugee population.

48. A UNHCR/WFP joint assessment mission carried out in September 2009 noted the considerable progress that had been achieved in the areas of food distribution, related monitoring and improved coordination between all the relevant actors, while at the same time confirming the need for continued food assistance. The joint assessment mission made useful nutritional recommendations that WFP will try to implement in its future projects, including the fortification and diversification of all commodities whenever possible.

49. Through its implementing partners, UNHCR continued to give utmost consideration to the issues of water and sanitation in the camps through the construction of water networks. European Commission Humanitarian Office and UNHCR funds have made possible the installation of water pipelines in three sectors in Smara camp, benefiting some 34,000 refugees. Camps Dakhla and Awsard have already benefited from such pipelines, which reduce the use of water tankers.

50. UNHCR continued to support the education sector through the provision of 53,270 schoolbooks and 180,325 textbooks. Three secondary schools, of a total of seven, were also equipped with new laboratories. UNHCR provided incentives to all teachers at Dakhla and Smara camps and at the 12 October boarding school, on the way to Dakhla camp (552 teachers of a total of 2,133 education staff). Support for vocational training continued, with a particular focus on women, young people and handicapped persons. UNHCR also supported legal training as well as the conduct of seminars for lawyers and judges, and the refurbishment of administrative premises in the 27 February camp.

51. UNHCR, through its implementing partners, continued to support medical facilities in the camps through the provision of equipment and training to nurses and midwives.

E. Confidence-building measures

52. Since 2004, UNHCR has been facilitating contact and communication between Western Saharan refugees in the camps near Tindouf and their families in the Territory through the exchange of family visits and the provision of free telephone services. UNHCR continued to implement its programme of confidence-building measures as a strictly humanitarian programme, in close cooperation with the Frente Polisario, and Morocco as well as Algeria, as the host country to the Saharan refugees.

53. UNHCR continued to provide free telephone services for refugees in the camps to contact family members in the Territory. During the reporting period, between April 2009 and March 2010 refugees placed 20,362 calls to relatives in the

Territory. Since the service was launched in June 2004, refugees have placed 127,162 telephone calls, of which 55 per cent were placed by women. UNHCR has continued to work towards establishing a telephone centre in the Dakhla refugee camp, and plans in 2010 to improve the telephone centres and add Internet service.

54. Exchanges of family visits continued, thanks to the efforts of UNHCR and MINURSO and generally good cooperation by the parties concerned. Between April 2009 and March 2010, 37 round-trip family visits were conducted during which 1,137 beneficiaries travelled to the Tindouf camps and 1,188 beneficiaries travelled to cities in the Territory west of the berm. UNHCR is taking steps, in concert with the parties, to ensure that further visits can proceed as planned. A total of 41,237 Saharans are currently registered to participate in the family visits. Since the programme began in March 2004, 10,182 people (24 per cent of those registered), mostly women, children and elderly persons, have participated in the family visits.

55. In order to shorten the waiting period for persons registered for family visits, and in line with Security Council resolutions 1813 (2008) and 1871 (2009), UNHCR is continuing its efforts to implement the road option as an expansion of the family visits.

56. In the course of his visit to the region, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees obtained the verbal agreement of the parties to expand the current confidence-building measure by land, using the most direct route from Tindouf to Smara and Laayoune. The addition of travel by road to the ongoing use of air travel would benefit around 4,400 Saharans annually, compared with the current 2,218 beneficiaries. Other components of the proposed expansion include organizing family visits around special events such as weddings, and a summer camp for young people and children. Tentative plans have been made for an evaluation of the current programme with the parties in Geneva in April 2010.

57. For the implementation of the confidence-building measures programme, MINURSO continued to provide, on a reimbursable basis, logistical, security and administrative support to UNHCR, including aircraft and ground transportation, as well as a member of the MINURSO Malaysian medical unit to accompany each flight. The United Nations police is also a key component of the assistance provided by MINURSO in the context of the confidence-building measures programme. As at 31 March, the police component of MINURSO stood at six personnel, including three women officers. United Nations police officers observed airport procedures at arrival and departure points; distributed and retrieved travel documents to and from beneficiaries while on board United Nations flights; accompanied UNHCR staff, escorted beneficiaries and responded to emergencies and/or requests for assistance during visits. If the parties agree on the envisaged expansion of the programme, either through an increased number of flights or by the opening of a land route, the authorized strength of the MINURSO police component would need to be increased as appropriate.

F. Irregular migrants

58. Since my previous report to the Council, one irregular migrant remained in the Territory under the care of the Frente Polisario in the locality of Bir Lahlou. The migrant, a Nigerian, finally agreed to be voluntarily repatriated to his country of

origin, and his case was submitted to the International Organization for Migration in February.

G. Human rights

59. The United Nations has no staff on the ground to address human rights issues, since MINURSO does not have a specific human rights mandate and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has no presence in the Territory or in the refugee camps in Tindouf. Nonetheless, the United Nations recognizes its duty to uphold human rights standards in all its operations, including those relating to Western Sahara. Both parties to the conflict often accuse each other, in communications with the United Nations or in the media, of human rights violations.

60. During the period under review, the Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario wrote to me on a number of occasions mainly to express concern about alleged violations of human rights affecting Saharans both in the Territory and within Morocco. All letters were registered and forwarded to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Moroccan authorities and media continued to assert that the Frente Polisario was raising the issue of human rights in an attempt to deviate from the core issues related to the negotiations. On several occasions, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco also conveyed his concern at the humanitarian situation of Saharans in the Tindouf refugee camps and the responsibility of Algeria and UNHCR in that regard.

61. In August, six young Saharans were reportedly stopped at the Agadir airport and prevented by the Moroccan authorities from travelling to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, where they had been invited by a United Kingdom-based non-governmental organization to participate in a conference with students from Morocco, the Tindouf camps and several European countries.

62. In October, a group of well-known Saharan activists who had travelled to the Tindouf camps in a highly publicized visit were arrested on their return and later charged with treason by a military tribunal. The only woman in the group was released from prison on 28 January because of health concerns. The Frente Polisario wrote to me on several occasions asking me to ensure the safety and security of Saharans and to enable their release from Moroccan jails.

63. In the case of the detention of Ms. Haidar, a resident of Laayoune and prominent human rights activist, on 14 November (see para. 7), the Moroccan authorities stated that she had refused to indicate Moroccan nationality on her immigration form. They withdrew her Moroccan passport and expelled her to Spain's Canary Islands nearby. Ms. Haidar began a hunger strike at Lanzarote airport, demanding to return to her home and family in Laayoune. The situation drew the attention of the international news media. Eventually her hunger strike prompted reactions from high Government officials of several countries, including France, Spain and the United States. I shared my concern about her health and the rising tensions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, Miguel Ángel Moratinos Cuyaubé, and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco, Mr. Fassi-Fihri, with whom I met to urge Morocco to resolve this situation. After 32 days, Ms. Haidar suspended her hunger strike upon being allowed by Morocco to return to Laayoune. Another concern was also addressed when the Government of

Morocco agreed in February to return the passports of a number of Saharan activists which had been seized or had expired without renewal.

H. Administration of the Mission and security measures

64. Since my previous report, security-related efforts aimed at bringing the Mission into compliance with the United Nations minimum operating standards has been progressing, both at the team sites and at Mission headquarters. Completion of the work is scheduled for 30 June 2010.

65. Facility and infrastructural improvements at MINURSO team sites are ongoing, with a planned completion date of 30 June 2011. The replacement of the soft-wall structures currently used as accommodation is ongoing; hard-wall structures are now the norm at team sites Awsard, Oum Dreyga, Mahbas and Bir Lahlou. Team sites Smara and Tifariti will be finished by 30 June 2010. The two remaining team sites, Agwanit and Mehaires, will be completed by 30 June 2011. Water-treatment plants have been installed at team sites Mahbas and Bir Lahlou. Team sites Smara and Tifariti will be similarly equipped by 30 June 2010. Mission headquarters in Laayoune also has a water-treatment plant. Since my previous report, the Mission's efforts to rehabilitate desert airfields at team sites west of the berm is still ongoing, thanks to the assistance of the Royal Moroccan Army; two runways have been reconstructed at Mahbas and Oum Dreyga. Awsard runway is under construction and expected to be finished by 30 June 2010. MINURSO is also carrying out the necessary work on the operational runway in Agwanit, east of the berm. Finally, the Mission has launched an environmental protection programme, in line with my efforts towards "greening the United Nations" and the promotion of sustainable energy.

66. Satellite phones have been issued to all team sites for backup purposes. The programme aimed at improving VHF radio communications coverage is still ongoing (S/2009/200, para. 25), with the installation of additional repeaters throughout the area of operations. The delay in the implementation of the programme was due to the lack of heavy equipment required to build the towers.

I. Conduct and discipline issues

67. I am pleased to announce that the prehistoric rock art that had been defaced by MINURSO personnel, principally in the locality of Devil Mountain (Lejuad), near Agwanit, has been restored. MINURSO contracted with a team of restoration professionals, including an archaeologist, to repair the damage that had been done with spray paint. The restoration was carried out in February. In addition to Devil Mountain, it included a clean-up of some of the graffiti damaging the Tifariti (Rekeiz) cave paintings and the numbers painted on the rock engravings near Bir Lahlou (Sluguilla).

V. African Union

68. The observer delegation of the African Union to MINURSO, led by its Senior Representative, Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia), continued to cooperate with the Mission

during the period under review. I wish to reiterate my appreciation to the African Union for its contribution.

VI. Financial aspects

69. The General Assembly, by its resolution 63/300, appropriated the amount of $53.5 million for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010. The proposed budget for MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 in the amount of $58.2 million (exclusive of budgeted voluntary contributions in kind) has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration during the second part of its resumed sixty-fourth session.

70. As at 28 February 2010, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO amounted to $58.4 million. As a result of the outstanding assessed contributions, the Organization has not been in a position since April 2002 to reimburse the Governments providing troops for troop costs in the amount of $2.3 million and contingent-owned equipment costs in the amount of $0.4 million.

71. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at 28 February 2010 amounted to $3,782.7 million.

VII. Observations and recommendations

72. **I welcome the parties' continuing commitment to the process of negotiations as stated repeatedly to me and to my Personal Envoy, and their willingness to engage in the preparatory informal format that he has organized. However, the two informal meetings held in August 2009 and February 2010 produced no movement on the core substantive issues, and more work is needed before a fifth round of formal negotiations can be held.**

73. **After the second informal meeting, it became clear that neither party was prepared to accept the proposal of the other as the sole basis for future negotiations and that nothing in their relations or in the regional or international environment is likely to occur to change this in the foreseeable future. I recommend that the Security Council reiterate its call upon the parties, Morocco and the Frente Polisario, to negotiate in good faith and without any preconditions, under the auspices of my Personal Envoy, and to show the political will required to enter into substantive discussions and ensure the success of the negotiations, where possible by drawing on and developing the contents of their two proposals. Imagination and creativity will be needed if progress is to be made.**

74. **I remain concerned about the continuing violations of military agreement No. 1 by the parties. It is the responsibility of the parties to ensure that violations are not committed by their military forces, and I call on the parties to adhere fully to the provisions of the military agreements and to extend their full cooperation to MINURSO. I encourage the parties to establish direct cooperation and communication through a joint military verification mechanism to discuss allegations of violations and other issues of common interest.**

75. The human dimension of the conflict, including the plight of the Western Saharan refugees, is a growing concern. I urge the parties to confirm their agreement to the expansion of the family visit programme and to accelerate their consultations with UNHCR on its implementation, as this would enable a significantly higher number of individuals in Western Sahara and the refugee camps to participate. I also urge the parties to continue to work with UNHCR and MINURSO, as well as with my Personal Envoy, to explore other confidence-building measures and contacts. So as to ensure the optimal use of United Nations resources and in order to facilitate support for the confidence-building measure programme, I recommend that the Security Council formally recognize and increase the role and responsibilities of MINURSO in using its resources to support the confidence-building activities. Likewise, I urge the donor community to explore ways to make increased funding available to permit the maintenance and expansion of such activities. Finally, I urge that appropriate attention be paid to the issues of conducting a census of refugees and implementing a programme of individual interviews.

76. I am concerned by the situation with regard to human rights. Each side accuses the other of violations relating to Saharans in the Territory and in the refugee camps, and each denies the accusations made against it. I repeat once more my call to each party to remain engaged in continuous and constructive dialogue with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights with a view to ensuring respect for the human rights of the people of Western Sahara in the Territory and in the refugee camps. The United Nations and the international community as a whole have an interest in advancing respect for international human rights standards and in ensuring that each party to the conflict understands its responsibilities in this regard.

77. I am pleased to note the decrease in the number of accidents due to landmines and explosive remnants of war in the region; however, the higher number of victims highlights the urgent need to increase coordination and operations. The mine action activities that are being undertaken by MINURSO, the Royal Moroccan Army and Landmine Action have proved invaluable and contribute directly and positively to the safety of the civilian population in the region, as well as of United Nations personnel. I also note with satisfaction the increased cooperation in information-sharing with the Royal Moroccan Army and Landmine Action. I encourage the parties to continue to work with MINURSO in order to ensure that this valuable work through the sharing of information can continue, while maintaining and increasing momentum on mine-clearance activities. To allow this vital work to continue, as well as for Landmine Action to provide an emergency response team for mine accident response east of the berm, additional resources for the United Nations mine-action effort in Western Sahara will be required. Such activities require an emphasis on prevention, and increased activities require additional funding beyond voluntary contributions. In that regard, MINURSO has made provision in its 2010/11 budget submission to accommodate the need for increased activities. I call upon donor countries to support the efforts of the parties in order to take advantage of the progress and investments made to date.

78. Given the existing circumstances on the ground and in the light of my Personal Envoy's continuing efforts, I believe that the presence of MINURSO remains indispensable for the maintenance of the ceasefire in Western Sahara.

Therefore, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for a further period of one year, until 30 April 2011.

79. **In conclusion, I wish to thank Christopher Ross, my Personal Envoy, for his diligence in working with the parties towards a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict in Western Sahara. I wish also to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Hany Abdel-Aziz, who since his appointment on 5 November has been in charge of the Mission; to the Force Commander, Major General Jingmin Zhao (China); and to the women and men of MINURSO for the work they are doing, under difficult circumstances, to fulfil the Mission's mandate.**

Annex

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

Contributions as at 20 March 2010

Country	*Military observers*[a]	*Troops*[a]	*Civilian police*[b]	*Total*
Argentina	3	0	0	3
Austria	2	0	0	2
Bangladesh	8	0	0	8
Brazil	10	0	0	10
China	10	0	0	10
Croatia	7	0	0	7
Djibouti	2	0	0	2
Egypt	20	0	2	22
El Salvador	6	0	3	9
France	13	0	0	13
Ghana	10	7	0	17
Greece	1	0	0	1
Guinea	5	0	0	5
Honduras	11	0	0	11
Hungary	7	0	0	7
Ireland	3	0	0	3
Italy	5	0	0	5
Jordan	2	0	1	3
Malaysia	10	20	0	30
Mongolia	4	0	0	4
Nigeria	8	0	0	8
Pakistan	11	0	0	11
Paraguay	5	0	0	5
Poland	1	0	0	1
Republic of Korea	2	0	0	2
Russian Federation	20	0	0	20
Sri Lanka	1	0	0	1
Uruguay	3	0	0	3
Yemen	10	0	0	10
Total	**200**	**27**	**6**	**233**[c]

[a] Authorized strength is 231, including the Force Commander.

[b] Authorized strength is 6.

[c] Actual strength on the ground, for military and civilian police, including the Force Commander.



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General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 14
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 7 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the annexed four statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning the tenth round of the Geneva talks, held on 29 and 30 March 2010; the establishment of the trade mission of the Russian Federation on the occupied territory of Georgia; the construction-assemblage works of heliports on Georgia's occupied territories; and the ratification of the agreements on "joint efforts for the protection of the so-called border" between Russia and the Sokhumi and Tskhinvali proxy regimes (see annex I-IV).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 14, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-30963 (E) 140410

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Annex I to the identical letters dated 7 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the tenth round of the Geneva talks, held on 29 and 30 March 2010

The tenth round of the Geneva talks was held on 29 and 30 March 2010, where the issues of security and stability in Georgia's occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions and the safe and dignified return of the internally displaced persons and refugees to the places of their habitual residence were discussed. Meetings of the two working groups were held, in which participants took part in an individual capacity. Deliberations were moderated by the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and attended by participants from Georgia, the United States and the Russian Federation. The Secretary-General's recently appointed representative to Georgia, Antti Turunen, attended the discussions for the first time. The Head of the provisional administration of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District, Dimitri Sanakoev, and the Chairman of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, Giorgi Baramia, took part in the tenth round of the Geneva talks. Representatives of the proxy regimes from Tskhinvali and Sokhumi also participated in the working groups.

The Geneva discussions started with two information sessions on 29 March. During these meetings the representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provided information on the registration of the refugees and internally displaced persons and the "go-and-see" visits to the places of previous habitual residence. The Georgian side welcomes such information sessions and expects that this practice will continue during the forthcoming rounds as well. Particular importance needs to be attached to the information session on the monitoring of the human rights violations in the occupied territories. During this session, participants will listen to the representatives of various international organizations and consider recommendations on ways to improve human rights protection in the occupied regions.

On 30 March, discussions were held within the two working groups. Unfortunately, no results were reached this time because of the rigid position of the representatives of the Russian Federation and its proxy regimes. Georgian participants once again raised the issue of the full implementation of the 12 August ceasefire agreement and the unconditional withdrawal of the Russian forces from the occupied regions of Georgia.

Moscow and its proxy regimes in Tskhinvali and Sokhumi continue to block the document of the Co-Chairs on the non-use of force and international security arrangements. The Georgian side welcomes this document despite its minimal content and believes that it represents a step in the right direction, which will allow the development of an effective international mechanism contributing to the fulfilment of the obligations under the 12 August ceasefire agreement.

Participants from Russia once again voiced their well-known positions on the unacceptability of the presence of international missions on the occupied territories,

inadmissibility of the monitoring of the human rights violations and impossibility of unimpeded access of the humanitarian cargoes. These positions further distance Moscow from the views of the international community.

Participants of the tenth round of the Geneva Talks discussed the necessity to resume the full-fledged functioning of the incident prevention and response mechanisms. The incident prevention and response mechanism related to the Tskhinvali region has not been working since October 2009, whereas the effective participation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in this mechanism is not yet possible due to the incomprehensible position of Moscow and the Tskhinvali proxy regime. Discussions further focused on improvement of the effectiveness of the incident prevention and response mechanisms by carrying out joint visits and intensifying the exchange of information. However, the prospects of these elements materializing remain minimal at this stage due to the negative position of Moscow and its proxy regimes.

It should be especially noted that Moscow's statements during the talks were particularly threatening and aggressive.

At the session of the second working group, participants continued to discuss the document on the joint undertakings proposed by the Co-Chairs. This document envisages a combination of the measures aimed at ensuring the safe and dignified return of the refugees and internally displaced persons to the places of their habitual residence. This time, protection of the human rights and the go-and-see visits were discussed in detail. Moscow and its proxy regimes once again tried to politicize the issue in order to block any opportunity of agreement.

Representatives of Moscow and the proxy regimes continued to question the fundamental right of the refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes in safety and dignity. This approach indicates clearly that Moscow carries on with its decade-old policy of impeding the process of internally displaced person return.

Participants agreed to hold the eleventh round of the Geneva talks on 8 June 2010.

Tbilisi, 31 March 2010

Annex II to the identical letters dated 7 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on establishment of the trade mission of the Russian Federation on the occupied territory of Georgia, in the so-called "Republic of Abkhazia"

On 31 March 2010, the Government of Russia issued the order about establishment of the trade mission of the Russian Federation on the occupied territory of Georgia, in the so-called "Republic Abkhazia".

The aforesaid fact is yet another gross violation of the universally recognized norms and principles of international law, another attempt of encroachment on the sovereignty of Georgia and manifestation of the policy of annexation of integral parts of territory of Georgia. After the conclusion of the so-called agreements on creation of military bases and joint protection of the so-called "borders", Russia through this step tries to completely include the occupied territories not only in its military and political, but also economic space.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expresses its strong protest over these destructive actions carried out by Russia and demands to stop the occupation and annexation of integral parts of Georgia.

Tbilisi, 6 April 2010

Annex III to the identical letters dated 7 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the announcement of an open auction for awarding a State contract on construction-assemblage works of heliports on Georgia's occupied territories of Java and Akhalgori

The official website of the Russian Federation posted information on the plan to hold an open auction for awarding a State contract on construction-assemblage works of heliports on Georgia's occupied territories of Java and Akhalgori.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia once again focuses the international community's attention on the military build-up taking place on the Russian-occupied territories, which, apart from the creation of military bases, includes construction of military heliports, which may lead to a further violation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The creation and development of military infrastructure on the occupied territories represents a flagrant violation of the fundamental norms and principles of international law and the six-point ceasefire agreement. Besides, the announcement of the Russian national tender on the occupied territory of the Tskhinvali region indicates once again that Russia is an occupier, which exercises an effective control on Georgia's occupied territories. Moreover, the uncontrolled flight of military helicopters in Georgian airspace poses a threat to the security of international civil aviation, the principles of which are upheld in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expresses its strict protest over Russia's destructive actions and calls on the international community to take decisive measures in order to prevent militarization of Georgia's occupied regions, infringement of Georgia's sovereignty as well as the occupation and annexation of its integral territories.

Tbilisi, 31 March 2010

Annex IV to the identical letters dated 7 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the ratification of the agreements on "joint efforts for the protection of the so-called border" between Russia and the Sokhumi and Tskhinvali proxy regimes

On 26 March 2010, the State Duma of the Russian Federation ratified the agreements on "joint efforts for the protection of the so-called border" concluded on 30 April 2009 between Russia and the Sokhumi and Tskhinvali proxy regimes.

This provocative action of the Russian Federation represents a gross violation of the fundamental norms and principles of international law, demonstrative neglect of the six-point agreement, an attempt to forcefully legitimize changes of the internationally recognized State borders of the sovereign country and yet another demonstration of the deliberate policy of annexation of the occupied territories. Any agreement concluded between an occupying country and its own proxy regimes is null and void from the standpoint of international law.

Georgia calls on the international community to give a due assessment of Russia's destructive actions and activate efforts for the prevention of the occupation and annexation of Georgia's integral territories.

Tbilisi, 26 March 2010

United Nations S/2010/177

Security Council

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Letter dated 8 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to send you the report of the workshop for newly elected and present Security Council members, which was held on 19 and 20 November 2009 at the Arrowwood Conference Center (see annex). The final report has been compiled in accordance with the Chatham House rules under the sole responsibility of the Permanent Mission of Finland.

On the basis of the very positive feedback we have received each year from the participants, the Government of Finland remains committed to sponsoring the workshop as an annual event. The Government of Finland hopes that this report will not only help to familiarize newly elected members with the working methods and procedures of the Council, but also will contribute to a better understanding among the wider United Nations membership of the complexity of the work of the Council.

I should be grateful, accordingly, if this report could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jarmo **Viinanen**
Ambassador
Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

10-30001 (E) 120410

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 8 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

"Hitting the Ground Running": Seventh Annual Workshop for Newly Elected Members of the Security Council

19 and 20 November 2009
Arrowwood Conference Center
Rye Brook, New York

The Government of Finland — in cooperation with the Center on International Organization of Columbia University, the Security Council Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat, and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) — convened the seventh annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Security Council on 19 and 20 November 2009.

The annual workshops have served to help familiarize the newly elected members with the practice, procedure, and working methods of the Council so that they are in a position to "hit the ground running" when they join the Council the following January. The series has also provided current members of the Council with an opportunity to reflect on their work in an informal setting. The workshops have been designed to complement the annual UNITAR briefings on aspects of the Council's work.

This year, the opening evening featured remarks by Mr. Vijay Nambiar, Chef de Cabinet of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.

The full-day programme on 20 November included four round-table sessions which focused on the following themes:

I. State of the Council 2009: taking stock and looking ahead

II. Working methods

III. Security Council missions, committees and working groups

IV. Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2009

Mr. Vijay Nambiar, Chef de Cabinet of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, delivered the keynote address at the opening dinner. He began his remarks by thanking the Finnish delegation for convening the seventh annual workshop for newly elected members of the Security Council, as well as the Center on International Organization of Columbia University, the Security Council Affairs Division, and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research for their support of the event. After congratulating the incoming members of the Security Council — Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Gabon, Lebanon and Nigeria — he suggested that the title of the event, "Hitting the Ground Running", was an understatement, as new Council members had to "hit the ground sprinting" given the quantity and complexity of the issues before the Council.

Quoting the background paper prepared for the workshop by Professor Edward Luck of Columbia University, the Chef de Cabinet observed that the Security Council does indeed have "a well earned reputation as the busiest and most productive inter-governmental organ in the United Nations system". He noted that it

is being called upon to address more challenges in more places than ever before. Since today's global challenges cannot be solved by any single nation acting alone, the Security Council has come to embody what the Secretary-General has called "renewed multilateralism". Increasingly, publics have come to associate the Security Council with the world body. According to the Chef de Cabinet, people expect the Council to recognize their needs, to understand the root causes of the problems facing them, and to respond promptly and effectively to their emergencies. When crises occur, people in need have little patience for debate or delay. They want the Council to act. While genuine differences of opinion can be obstacles to a timely response, it should be understood that the more the delay, the more the misery on the ground.

The workshop, in the Chef de Cabinet's view, was therefore about making the Council work better. It would provide participants with the opportunity to delve deeply into several core themes: a stocktaking of the Council; an examination of its working methods; a look at its missions, committees and working groups; and a reflection on lessons learned by outgoing members.

The relationship between the Secretariat and the Security Council, noted the Chef de Cabinet, is a particularly critical one in the United Nations system, encompassing both many direct interactions at Headquarters and, increasingly, the Secretariat's implementation of Council-approved mandates in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. In Afghanistan, the focus had first been on political stabilization, and then on supporting free and fair elections. Now, while earlier priorities had not gone away, the question of staff security in Afghanistan had become the issue of primary concern, since the United Nations was being targeted not for what it did, but for what it was.

According to the Chef de Cabinet, the incoming members of the Council are likely to face several key challenges in the upcoming months. Among these, he suggested, would be the renewal of the mandate for the United Nations Mission in Nepal in January 2010 under "complicated circumstances", the expiration of the mandate for the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the likely postponement of the elections in that country, the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the challenge of endemic violence against the civilian population in that country, and major political developments in the Sudan as the country prepared for the elections and referendum in 2010 and 2011, respectively, and their impact on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

The Chef de Cabinet identified four areas in which cooperation between the Council and the Secretariat could be strengthened. The first involved the informal interactions between Council members and the Secretariat, such as consultations of various kinds, bilateral meetings with the Secretary-General and other senior staff, "informal interactive discussions", and the Secretary-General's monthly luncheons with the Council. These could be very useful in conveying information on issues not on the Council's agenda. As an example, he referred to the luncheon in October 2009 at which the Secretary-General briefed Council members on events in Guinea, highlighting a request from the African Union and ECOWAS to establish an independent commission of investigation. Many Council members expressed their support for the establishment of such a commission, which was formed and later

endorsed through a Security Council presidential statement. This is one of the best mechanisms, noted the Chef de Cabinet, for getting the Council more involved in early conflict prevention initiatives before situations deteriorate and a peacekeeping mission is required. He emphasized, in that regard, that the effectiveness of the good offices of the Secretary-General could be enhanced by the support of the Security Council, particularly when it was united behind his good offices.

The second area highlighted by the Chef de Cabinet was formal and informal reports and letters. The Secretariat, he observed, should tell the Council what it needs to know, rather than what it wants to hear. The Secretariat should provide the Council with honest and objective information on crucial peace and security issues, whether or not they are on the Council's agenda. Though acknowledging that the Secretariat is occasionally late with its reporting, as a result of the multiple layers of review and approval that reports undergo before being issued, he asserted that it was doing its best to become more disciplined in meeting reporting deadlines established by the Council.

The third area of interaction addressed was the Secretariat's role in directly implementing the mandates of the Council. In terms of peacekeeping operations, the Chef de Cabinet noted that sometimes mandates were a result of such delicate political compromises that they proved impossible to implement on the ground, because of unrealistic goals, a lack of resources, or both. To address this challenge, he suggested that the Secretariat be engaged in helping the Council to design mandates at an early stage, facilitating a common understanding of the purpose and the resources required for mandate implementation. In any case, the Secretariat would continue to work with the Council to ensure that mandates had a clear political strategy for a resolution of the conflict, that they allowed for rapid deployment, and that they were adequately resourced.

The fourth and final area of interaction was the monitoring of sanctions regimes. To support these efforts, the Council had been innovative in establishing groups of experts, which the Secretariat helped to identify, outfit and support by providing information and making recommendations that would otherwise be lacking. Those groups had made an important contribution to the work of the Council. Though the independent nature of those groups sometimes led to recommendations that were challenging for the Council to implement, either for political reasons or because of a lack of capacity, the Chef de Cabinet nonetheless encouraged the Council to carefully consider and implement, where possible, the relevant recommendations.

In the view of the Chef de Cabinet, the relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council rests on three pillars. The first pillar is defined by Articles 97 and 99 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 97 specifies his role as the United Nations chief administrative officer, while Article 99 describes his political role vis-à-vis the Security Council. Each Secretary-General's relationship with the Security Council is defined, in large part, by how he interprets those functions, which should be undertaken with a balanced understanding of the possibilities and limits of his responsibilities. Impartiality and independence are the key elements of the second pillar. Impartiality, however, should not be equated with neutrality, he stressed. While the level of visibility of the Secretary-General varies from issue to issue and the division of labour with the Council was never static, the Security Council ultimately must own its decisions. With regard to the third pillar,

commented the Chef de Cabinet, the Secretary-General can assist the Council in working towards unity of purpose if an effort is made within the Council to strive towards common goals, regardless of the national position of each Council member. The Secretary-General's efforts in Myanmar and Sri Lanka were cited as examples. After developing a position that reflected the expectations of the Council and the international community, he undertook negotiations with the leadership of those countries. While his efforts were criticized in some quarters of the media, he believed that they reflected a commonality of goals and purpose within the Council.

In conclusion, the Chef de Cabinet reminded the incoming members that serving on the Council would afford them the privilege of thinking on a big scale, beyond the interests of their countries and regions. The Council considers not just issues of peace but also related questions of justice, human rights, and international humanitarian law. Over the years, moreover, the Council has expanded its focus beyond country-specific agenda items, to address cross-cutting themes, such as the protection of civilians, children in armed conflict, and women and peace and security. The Chef de Cabinet encouraged the newly elected members to look at their role in the Council through the widest possible lens, while being guided by the Charter as a fixed compass point.

Session I
State of the Council 2009: taking stock and looking ahead

Moderator:

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation

Commentators:

Ambassador Ruhakana Rugunda
Permanent Representative of Uganda

Ambassador Alejandro Wolff
Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States

Session I provided an opportunity for Council members to reflect on the current state of the Council's work and to look forward to the challenges that it will face in the upcoming months and years. The session focused on trends in the Council's agenda, workload and productivity; the growth and evolution of peacekeeping mandates and operations; cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements; and other vital issues on the Council's agenda.

Trends in the Council's agenda, workload and productivity

At the opening session, there was substantial discussion of the background paper prepared for the workshop by Professor Edward Luck of Columbia University. It had provided statistics suggesting a downturn in Council activity and output, as measured by the number of formal meetings, informal consultations, resolutions, and presidential statements. The paper commented that this might well be a healthy and encouraging trend for a body that was widely regarded as the most productive in the United Nations system and that had been working at a frenetic pace. Nevertheless, several speakers questioned whether the statistics fully and accurately

reflected either the Council's productivity or persistently heavy workload. One noted that members had to address Council business every day. Both meetings and statements were getting longer. In addition to at least four formal meetings a week, there were various informal meetings and consultations. Though open meetings may register as a single meeting, they often extend into day-long events. Moreover, this participant did not foresee the frequency of meetings declining, given continuing high demand for peacekeeping. Another member added that, according to his calculations, he had spent over 550 hours in the Council since his country was elected a member at the beginning of the year. In his view, the statistics cannot capture all the preparatory work and consultations involved in drafting documents for meetings and resolutions.

Similarly, it would be misleading to consider only formal meetings, emphasized another speaker, given the frequent meetings of sanctions committees, informal discussions outside the Council chamber and its informal consultations room, and discussions with other interlocutors. An example of the latter were the extensive discussions with the African Union mission that came to New York to discuss the indictment by the International Criminal Court of the President of the Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. In this participant's view, it was likely that a better sense of Council activities could be gained from looking at the time frame used for the annual Security Council report to the General Assembly (1 August to 31 July). Incoming members were advised to prepare for hard work and late hours over the coming two years.

Several discussants expressed concern that the body had become "a prisoner of too much business", with the dizzying pace of work and meetings leaving too little time for reflection or for strategic planning. As one participant put it, while the Council was designed to focus on "hotspots" that could threaten international peace and security, its agenda had become burdened with too many thematic issues. This tendency, he felt, would affect both the focus and efficiency of the Council. Another speaker agreed, adding that the Council was suffering from agenda "obesity", as it was taking on issues beyond its Charter-designated role. In its zeal to address so many issues, the Council, he cautioned, was "losing control of its appetite". On the other hand, a third speaker noted, there were in fact new threats to international peace and security, such as international drug trafficking and organized crime, that called for "new thinking and debate" in the Council.

Did the reduction of meetings and outcomes reflect an increase in the Council's efficiency or a decrease in its workload? asked one interlocutor. Either way, noted another, instead of focusing on quantitative indicators, such as numbers of presidential statements and resolutions, it would be better to try to develop parameters or indicators for measuring the Council's effectiveness in addressing threats to international peace and security. In that regard, one speaker stressed that the Council should empower people on the ground, instead of usurping their authority to tackle issues in their country or even competing with them. It was no wonder, he commented, that peacekeeping mandates often did not succeed or that sustainable peace was not achieved.

The participants also highlighted the Council's increasing tendency to operate by consensus. As one speaker noted, though there was no legal difference between resolutions adopted by majority vote and those adopted unanimously, he could not recall a split as large as 9 to 6 in Council votes. As the background paper had

pointed out, the premium on gaining consensus could give each member — permanent and non-permanent alike — greater voice and leverage in the negotiation of the texts of resolutions. However, the desire for unanimity, several speakers pointed out, could also increase the pressure on some members to go along with the majority. This sometimes happens, for instance, when "pre-cooked" drafts are put forward by small or external groups of States, such as a Group of Friends, that lobby Council members for their support. As one discussant observed, although the vast majority of resolutions in recent years were adopted unanimously, members were still continuously engaged in a process of trying to gauge which way the required majority of nine members would go and of then aligning their votes accordingly. Building consensus was no easy task, cautioned another speaker. He urged outgoing members to carry away a message to the wider United Nations membership that it was hard enough to conduct business with 15 Council members. Some modes of Council reform that were currently under discussion would make the business of the Council very difficult, or even impossible, he said.

Interactions with the Secretariat could be useful in developing a common information base for Council decision-making. According to several speakers, in that regard working lunches with the Secretary-General had proved particularly useful, providing opportunities for Council members to get a near-instant response from the Secretary-General on issues before the Council. Moreover, there was broad appreciation for the increasing engagement among the Council, the Secretariat, and regional and subregional organizations, a topic addressed in more detail below.

Growth and evolution of peacekeeping mandates and operations

Looking ahead, participants generally agreed that a continued high or even growing demand for United Nations peacekeeping operations would be a defining feature of the Council's agenda in coming years. International capacities — whether in terms of funding, troops, police or civilians — will continue to be severely strained. Several participants voiced concern that some countries were becoming "chronic beneficiaries" of peacekeeping operations, undermining local authority and capacity. Among the examples cited were Haiti, which has hosted mission after mission without a sustainable solution to its fundamental problems, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, site of the largest peacekeeping operation but of little political, economic or security progress in four decades. To illustrate the point, one speaker noted that the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, had been a peacekeeper in the Congo in the early 1960s.

Among the factors limiting the successful planning and completion of peacekeeping operations, noted several speakers, was the lack of analytical capacity at the United Nations to address the root causes of conflicts. As one participant noted, the United Nations often approached peacekeeping operations with a "standard package of solutions", whose impacts were not always fully understood and which often failed to take into account the voices of key local stakeholders in host countries. The United Nations should play a secondary or even tertiary role, he continued, to allow local populations to take the lead in finding sustainable solutions to armed conflict. Moreover, added another speaker, host countries were not sufficiently consulted regarding planned operations, nor were other United Nations organs or groups, such as the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly. He acknowledged that the Council is now taking greater account of the views of regional and subregional bodies, including

through the annual meeting of its members with the members of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. But he urged that more be done to make communications with these partners more timely and reliable.

Noting the intractable nature of several of the conflicts referred to the Council, one discussant observed that it had become like a "trauma centre" in a hospital: when cases proved too difficult to resolve in other forums, they were brought to the Council. Although neighbouring countries and regional and subregional organizations often have an interest in preventing the escalation of conflict, he continued, the United Nations is usually not their first conflict resolution option. As a result, too often Council members were faced with finding remedial, rather than preventive, solutions. As a consequence, added another participant, the Council tends to rush into action, taking decisions that are "not always thoughtful". This tendency, in his view, compromised the Council's effectiveness, as well as its ability to prepare adequately for peacekeeping missions. As another interlocutor put it, it would be helpful if the Council could apply lessons learned from earlier peacekeeping missions to make future ones more effective.

One participant commented that he could not recall a peacekeeping mandate for which the Council had, in advance of its authorization, asked the Secretariat what the expected costs would be, where the troops would come from, how the Council could help to resolve the crisis between the conflicting parties, or how the operation would affect the political landscape. Unless the Council had such objective and candid assessments when it was defining and shaping a peacekeeping mandate, there was a risk of the resulting mission becoming a "part of the landscape" and being automatically extended because Council members feared that the situation could dissolve should the operation be withdrawn. Concurring with these comments, another speaker noted that peacekeepers were often sent into situations where there was no peace to keep. In such cases, he observed, it was difficult for the Council to transform its role from "conflict regulation" to "conflict resolution".

Draft resolutions and mandates have been increasing in length and in the number of demands they place upon peacekeeping operations, it was noted, leaving commanders in the field confused about priorities and exit strategies. The mandate for MONUC, for example, includes 41 distinct tasks. One participant recalled an anecdote about the evolving views of a diplomat who once served on the Council, but now serves in the field in Africa. In the Council, this delegate had often pushed for more expansive mandates, but now seeing these matters from a field perspective, he appreciated the need for more concise and focused mandates.

The relationship among prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding was addressed from several perspectives. The growing emphasis on prevention and peacebuilding in the United Nations work was widely welcomed. Some speakers commended Secretariat efforts to place more emphasis on preventive diplomacy, including recently in Guinea and Madagascar. As one participant put it, through mediation, conflicts could be "nipped in the bud" and the need for peacekeeping operations significantly lessened. One discussant observed that preventive diplomacy was more a role for the Secretariat, as opposed to the Council, and that the Council should encourage it to be more active in this sphere. Another participant countered, however, that preventive diplomacy was in fact a Charter-based role of the Council also, with the Secretariat often acting as the implementer of what the

Council had decided. When, for instance, the Council highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy, mediation and peacebuilding, the Secretariat should act accordingly, given that the two bodies were complementary.

Concurring that peacebuilding was an important tool, one speaker contended that the Council did not do it very well. In peacebuilding, the Council's role was more supportive than operational. With the help of various players, peacebuilding succeeded in Burundi and elsewhere. Citing the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti as an example, another participant commented that, while peacekeeping can often create the environment needed for a country to move forward, to do so often required the investment of more resources in statebuilding and peacebuilding. This discussant asked, however, how peacebuilding initiatives might be introduced in circumstances where there was no peace operation deployed on the ground. According to one speaker, peacekeeping missions strive to create conditions for a political solution to take root, to "regulate" conflict, whereas peacebuilding initiatives focus more on conflict "resolution". The Council, he observed, with its Chapter VII enforcement powers, focused more on peacekeeping and thus on creating the right conditions for peacebuilding. The latter, however, was an important tool in preventing a fallback into conflict conditions. In that light, he saw the forthcoming review of the Peacebuilding Commission as a promising opportunity to reassess the relationship between the two functions. The Commission, observed another interlocutor, had been useful in establishing stability in countries where there was no peacekeeping force on the ground.

Greater cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements, including the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

Citing United Nations engagement with regional and subregional organizations, one participant commended the Council's work with the Organization of American States on Haiti and Honduras, with the Southern African Development Community on Madagascar, and with the African Union on a range of issues on that continent. Regional and subregional organizations had a "special understanding" of the complexities of situations within their own region, and they could be instrumental in resolving outstanding political problems. In the view of this discussant, "directly relating" to the affected populations could help officials at United Nations Headquarters to better understand their views. As an example, recent Council missions to Haiti, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Addis Ababa — where members of the Council mission met with members of the African Union Peace and Security Council — included significant interaction between Council members and the people on the ground. Given that the bulk of Council time was spent on African issues, the discussant noted that the regional organization that most often sought Council engagement was the African Union. Offering a "cautionary note", however, this participant emphasized that the Council and regional organizations were "different beasts" that, while complementing each other, were not very successful when one tried to substitute for the other. It was observed that Council decisions more and more took into account the views of regional organizations. Yet, cautioned another speaker, the relationship between the Council and regional organizations had not yet reached a level of "total confidence", and regional organizations and the Council had not yet developed an efficient formula for working together. On this subject, it was suggested that there had been some differences of opinion among elected and permanent members of the Council.

According to one participant, the Council had not sufficiently taken into account the views of the African Union. He urged that recommendations in the Secretary-General's reports on the region be agreed in advance between the secretariats of the United Nations and the African Union.

Another speaker strongly disagreed, contending that there was no reason for formal meetings or documents to be exchanged between the United Nations and the African Union and that the Secretariat should not have to "clear" recommendations with the African Union before they appeared in reports of the Secretary-General. Another participant, while welcoming the deepening relationship between the Council and regional bodies, agreed that regional organizations should not be regarded as "clearing houses" for the Secretary-General and the Security Council. The Council, of course, had very special responsibilities under the Charter. In his view, the mixed experience of UNAMID had demonstrated that there is no substitute for the Council's authority. Another participant disagreed, noting that, although the process had not been "pretty", UNAMID appeared to have made some contributions to diminishing violence in the region.

Looking ahead

Several participants commented on the ongoing struggle within the Council to reconcile principles and interests. This could be seen, it was said, in how the Council interprets what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. There were several instances of armed conflict and violence around the world that had not made their way on to the Council's agenda, observed one speaker, as they were not considered to be threats to international peace and security. Yet they affected large numbers of people and raised questions in the public mind about why the Council had not acted. The Council should develop a clearer set of guidelines about when to act in a given conflict, he suggested. This was particularly important given the appearance of new threats and challenges, such as drugs and organized crime, on the Council's agenda, added another speaker.

In the view of one of the discussants, the Council had not been sufficiently predictable in its responses, as narrow political interests too often shaped responses that should be based on broad normative principles. For example, he observed that some members wanted to defer a referral of President Omar al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court on political grounds, to allow more time for the resolution of conflicts in the region, while others were pushing for a referral of Israel and Hamas to the Court on the basis of the findings of the Goldstone report. Concurring, a second speaker declared that principles were more important and sustainable than politics, while a third one added that some principles are universally accepted and that the elected members could help to shape the Council's actions accordingly.

Another participant, stressing that the Council was not an academic body, strongly disagreed. It was, in his words, a heavily "political animal". It worked under constant pressure from the domestic front, regional political considerations, non-governmental organizations, and the media. It should be no surprise, he commented, that the Council does not react with consistency to each case before it. Each case, in his view, is sui generis and should be evaluated on its unique history and circumstances. One of the principal reasons the Council had been effective, he asserted, was its ability to judge each challenge on a case-by-case basis. The day it

lost that ability, he posited, it would cease to be effective. According to another speaker, navigating between these two divergent perspectives would continue to be a challenge for the Council in the coming years.

Over the course of the discussions, a number of challenges that would face the incoming class of Council members over the next two years were cited. African issues would again be prominent and occupy much of the Council's time. These would include: the MONUC transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; grappling for a way forward in the Sudan, where elections were scheduled in 2010 and a referendum in 2011; governance questions in West Africa; and Somalia and the role of the African Union Mission in Somalia. Outside Africa, a speaker contended, the Council had not discussed Afghanistan "as much as it should", and it would be crucial to strengthen the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, the Council would need to review the cases of Cyprus and Nepal, where exit strategies should be considered. The Council, it was pointed out, would also need to find a more constructive role to play in supporting peaceful resolutions to the conflicts in the Middle East. Other priority issues facing the Council would be non-proliferation issues related to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the relationship among peacekeeping, peacebuilding and mediation. According to another participant, the Goldstone report could pose a challenge during this period also.

Session II
Working methods

Moderator:

Ambassador Yukio Takasu
Permanent Representative of Japan

Commentators:

Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan
Permanent Representative of Turkey

Ambassador Liu Zhenmin
Deputy Permanent Representative of China

At this session, current members provided both an overview of the Council's working methods and some suggestions about how they might be improved. Among the items discussed were the structure and format of meetings and consultations, the relationship between the Council and various interlocutors, and the responsibilities of the President.

Perspectives on Council working methods

One participant highlighted two points from Professor Luck's background paper. The first described the Security Council as "the most adaptable of United Nations organs", while the second emphasized that a change in working methods was not an end in itself. With these points in mind, the speaker posited that many of the changes needed in Council working methods had been outlined in the note by the President distributed in July 2006 (S/2006/507). There was wide convergence around the table during this session, he observed, that everything that was needed to

be said was encapsulated in this paper. In his view, the problem was not identifying what needs to be done, but how to do it. Noting that the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions was currently reviewing the note to determine what had and had not been implemented, a discussant urged all participants to read it carefully.

Asserting that there is a unique culture of working methods in the Council, and that generations might be needed to change that culture, some participants stressed that the only way to succeed is to persist in implementing the changes. Once an improvement is made, for instance, it should be exercised repeatedly, as progress in working methods has sometimes been lost over time through disuse. As an example, the speaker recalled the 2002 annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, the introduction to which had been prepared by the delegation of Singapore (then a Council member). That introduction was quite analytical and interesting, but, to his regret, in later years the Council went back to the same old style of reporting.

As another discussant put it, there did not need to be a revolution in working methods, as the Council was the master of its own procedures. He added, however, that the Council should not ignore the fact that the wider membership had a particular interest in Council working methods. In this respect, he recalled the open debate held in August 2008 on the implementation of S/2006/507, where many non-members had taken the floor and called for more transparency, efficiency, accountability, legitimacy and respect in the workings of the Council.

Several speakers commented on the need to find the right balance among effectiveness, transparency and efficiency in the work of the Council. It was important, one participant observed, to consider how the Council was perceived by external audiences. The analyses of the Council that he had reviewed repeatedly mentioned the issues of democracy, legitimacy and legality — or lack thereof — in commenting on the Council's working methods. Other Member States and the public alike expect proper deliberation and reasoned argumentation as the Council addresses important issues. The legitimacy of the Council, noted another discussant, was derived largely from the respect that United Nations Members have for it. It therefore was incumbent upon its members to ensure that its working methods enabled the Council to earn the confidence of the broader United Nations membership and the global public.

Commenting on the trade-off between transparency and efficiency, one participant noted that, while having too many formal meetings could affect efficiency, it was good for transparency. According to another speaker, while there had been good progress on transparency, with more open meetings and more access to information, the very nature of the Council was to be a quasi-executive body, unlike the General Assembly. This meant that the main goal of the Council should be efficiency, not transparency. More transparency was useful, but sometimes less transparency meant more efficiency.

According to one discussant, the Peacebuilding Commission could provide some valuable lessons on successful working methods. Among these, he noted that the Commission's work is largely country-specific and therefore is more focused, that it has a more "intensive presence" in the field, that its deliberations tend to be more informal, and that it always involves the countries concerned when developing country strategies and plans. The heads of the Commission's country-specific

configurations made regular visits to the field, and the Commission was also more effective in the way it engaged with stakeholders. However, another speaker observed, though it was sometimes useful for a few "interested countries" in the Council to take the lead on a particular issue, in practice it often meant that other members were presented with draft documents in which they had little input.

Though there were advantages to maintaining some flexibility in meeting forecasts, one discussant complained that the Council's rules of procedures were still dubbed "provisional" more than 60 years after the founding of the world body. He suggested that members move to formalize their agreement on the rules, or else discard them altogether. Another participant strongly disagreed, declaring that attempts to modify working methods had become a "side show" to the more important business of the Council. Whether or not they were called "provisional", they were still regarded as the body's formal operating guidelines. According to another discussant, the role of the Council had changed, as its decisions now affected international law, with the Council becoming a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative body. This was why the Council needed to always act with the best available information and also with a sense of proportionality.

Several participants commented on the tendency for permanent and non-permanent members to view questions about Council working methods from different perspectives. According to some discussants, the permanent members have the advantage of a longer institutional memory and closer working relationships with external partners developed over the years. To compensate, one speaker urged the newly elected members to develop strong working relationships with the Secretariat, which had deep and authoritative knowledge of the Council's past and current practices. A second participant suggested that a thorough understanding of the Council's rules of procedure and working methods would empower elected members when engaging with the permanent ones. The unity of the permanent members on some matters was quite impressive, according to one discussant. In response, another speaker commented that the five permanent members most readily cooperated on institutional issues because their longer-term perspectives tended to place a high value on precedence and orderly procedure. As a number of participants stressed, the annual "Hitting the Ground Running" workshop was designed, in part, to enable newly elected members to integrate more successfully with current Council members by familiarizing themselves with its working methods and culture prior to beginning their term. Several of them also commented that, despite distinct perspectives on some matters, all members of the Council enjoyed remarkably good working relationships marked by a high level of camaraderie, cooperation and professionalism.

Meetings and consultations

There was wide agreement among participants at the workshop that the large number of Council meetings and consultations places a heavy burden on member delegations. This was ascribed, in part, to longer meetings at which all members felt obligated to make a statement, regardless whether the issue in question was a matter of national interest, because their silence could be misinterpreted. Moreover, open debates tended to become day-long events so as to accommodate all interested parties. As a result, there was a widely supported call for more informal and consultative meetings.

According to one participant, it was impossible to have interactive, short and to-the-point discussions at an open meeting, as the public forums were designed for expressing positions, not for discussing them. The same speaker noted that history had demonstrated that the more open the debates and the more the participation of non-members, the less effective the Council was and the less interaction members had among themselves. Another discussant suggested that the newly elected Council members would be surprised how often Council members make statements in consultations that could have been made publicly. The speaker opined that the culture of secrecy in the Council had pushed members to go to consultations to hear the same thing they would at an open meeting. The more the Council worked behind closed doors, moreover, the more its legitimacy suffered.

To encourage more interactive consultations, one participant suggested that remarks be shorter and less formal. Another urged members to consider not making statements on issues that do not affect their existing national interests. As in past "Hitting the Ground Running" workshops, the tendency of Council members to read prepared statements in informal consultations was lamented. In that context, one speaker suggested requesting the presidency to raise particular questions for discussion, so that they could be addressed directly in member interventions. In contrast, another discussant cautioned that, while he supported making consultations more interactive and remarks shorter, realistically it was sometimes difficult to avoid the use of written statements. This was particularly so with new issues, on which members needed to prepare themselves more thoroughly. Another participant, acknowledging the difficulties in moving away from written interventions, suggested that statements could be at least shortened and that Permanent Representatives work closely with their staff on reducing the length of prepared speeches. Finally, one interlocutor noted that the workload that members put on themselves also contributed to the lack of interactivity since written statements were safer and easier to prepare.

Other recommendations included cutting the number of meetings dedicated to reporting requirements or, alternatively, delegating them to experts to relieve some pressure on Permanent Representatives and other high-ranking diplomats. Participants noted with appreciation the use of an "informal interactive dialogue" in the case of Sri Lanka, a new format in which Council members can meet privately with relevant parties to an issue without placing it on the formal agenda. The result was a blunt, candid and productive exchange of views on developments in that country.

In one speaker's view, the word "respect" was critical when talking about working methods. He recalled that one of his delegation's first challenges on working methods was at a meeting at which the Council voted on a draft resolution imposing sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian representative was slated to speak last at the meeting. The speaker's delegation, however, thought that it was a matter of respect to permit the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to speak before the adoption of the resolution and before the Council members made statements explaining their votes. In the end, another Council delegation negotiated a formula by which all of the Permanent Representatives of Council members would remain until the end of the meeting to hear the Iranian statement, as opposed to exiting the Chamber upon making their respective interventions.

Pointing out that open meetings and open debates were needed for accountability, a speaker complained that after the 15 Council members had spoken and non-members took the floor the room was often half-empty, with only low-level representatives sitting at the Council table and in the Chamber. Thus, while open debates were supposed to be a good way to hear the opinions of non-members of the Council, he questioned whether such poorly attended meetings helped to address this concern. Commenting on the format of meetings and participation, one interlocutor observed that those two issues were clearly laid out in the provisional rules of procedure and that all meetings were open unless otherwise decided. This speaker criticized instances where directly interested countries could not participate in discussions, where consultations were held so that criticism of a State would not be public, or where open meetings were used so that criticism could be aired publicly. He hoped that in the future, when the Council was deciding whether a meeting should be public or not, national interests of this sort would not influence members' decisions on formats.

Relationship of the Council with various interlocutors

As several discussants pointed out, the perception of the legitimacy and legality of Council actions is affected by the quality of the relationship it enjoys with varied interlocutors, including the press, civil society and the broader United Nations membership. Particular attention, it was suggested, should be paid to troop- and police-contributing countries and to States particularly interested in, or affected by, specific situations on the Council's agenda. The increasing demand for and the growing complexity and lethality of peace operations have prompted troop- and police-contributing countries and other Member States to seek closer engagement with the Council, especially in the early stages of discussions regarding possible peacekeeping missions, as well as participation in meetings of the Council's Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

Several speakers commended the Council's growing engagement with troop- and police-contributing countries, but called for further steps in that direction. While acknowledging the need to have more meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries, several participants suggested that the real question was how to improve the effectiveness of the meetings that were held. All participants, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the contributing countries, needed to ensure that they were well prepared and focused, knowing what issues they wanted to discuss. It was also suggested that the Secretariat should be encouraged to bring up pending issues in advance of the meetings to help facilitate the dialogue. Similarly, another speaker stated that it would be useful if questions were provided beforehand, so that the meetings would be more focused and the Secretariat would be better prepared to react to questions. According to one discussant, the consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries often took place at a point too late in the discussion of possible peacekeeping missions, while another agreed that interaction with contributing countries should be more "systematic, intensive and upstream". It was suggested that the Council consider sharing draft resolutions with troop- and police-contributing countries, so that they could make contributions to the text during the negotiations process. Such a two-way flow of information would enable members to make more informed decisions about situations requiring Council action.

There was discussion, as well, of the use of "15+1" meetings between Council members and a concerned party, giving members the opportunity to listen to the other side of the story. In this context, some speakers encouraged the more frequent use of informal meetings with the countries concerned. Employment of this format was also seen as a positive response to concerns of the broader membership regarding opportunities to contribute to Council debates of particular relevance to their interests. In the view of another speaker, it could be helpful, as well, for the host countries of peace operations to become more involved in deliberations on missions and mandates, so as to contribute their perspectives and specialized knowledge towards enhancing the Council's analytical and operational capacities. Arria-formula meetings were also cited as a vehicle for more informal and frequent engagement with experts and the broader membership.

As one participant observed, the credibility of the Council was tied to its accountability to Member States. For example, he noted, when States not members of the Council asked why the Council chose to intervene in certain situations and not others, Council members should be able to respond. In line with this view, a second speaker pointed out that, though the Security Council was not formally responsible to the General Assembly, it was responsible to the full membership for the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently, as the General Assembly represents the full United Nations membership, he called for greater interaction and cooperation among the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council. Another discussant called for more regular meetings among the Presidents of the three bodies. He suggested that they be invited to the Council's working lunches with the Secretary-General, at the latter's discretion.

Though some participants urged greater engagement with the media and civil society, one speaker pointed out that there was an inherent contradiction in pushing for briefer and more focused meetings, while at the same time advocating for increasing the number of participants and the informality of the discussions. If a consultation room was filled with the media or non-governmental organizations, he pointed out, it would become a forum where Member States felt obligated to state formalized positions. The more non-members participate in its work, the less interactive the Council would become, he contended, and the less work it would get done.

The responsibilities of the President

Several speakers commented on the roles and responsibilities of the President of the Council. It could, they emphasized, be a particularly challenging and rewarding moment for an elected member. But it is no easy task. The President of the Security Council, observed one participant, had to serve as convener of the Council, "speaker of the house", and master of procedures. The President was expected to encourage members to reach a consensus whenever possible. The public role as speaker of the house was said to be particularly difficult in that Presidents needed to reach out to the media and objectively articulate and convey the state of play among members on the many issues before the Council. This task was made that much more difficult, another discussant complained, when some Permanent Representatives at times step out of the Council chamber during sessions to engage with the press and then return to shape the outcome. Such behaviour undermines the President's capacity to act as spokesperson for the Council. It would be better

practice to let the President be the first to meet the press to relate the cumulative sentiments of the Council's members as a whole.

Addressing such concerns, one speaker recommended that Presidents be given greater flexibility in terms of speaking to the media and more leeway in shaping the Council's interactions with non-members. In the latter case, the President would determine the participation of non-members in consultations that particularly affect them. In addition, this discussant suggested that Presidents be allowed to organize a briefing for States not members of the Council, which would take place at the conclusion of each presidency.

Given the concerns voiced during the first session regarding the length of Council meetings and deliberations, one participant noted that presidential statements are also growing. As another speaker put it, though the number of statements may be declining, their word count seems to be expanding. The value of presidential statements, one discussant reminded other participants, derived not from their length but from their specificity and concreteness. He urged them, therefore, to draft briefer and more focused texts when called upon to deliver a presidential statement.

Session III
Security Council missions, committees and working groups

Moderator:

Ambassador Claude Heller
Permanent Representative of Mexico

Commentators:

Ambassador Thomas Mayr-Harting
Permanent Representative of Austria

Minister Counsellor Nicolas de Rivière
Deputy Permanent Representative of France

At the outset, it was noted that Security Council subsidiary bodies play an increasingly central normative role, as they address core thematic issues, such as terrorism and peacekeeping. There was also a call for more discussion of the precise nature of the Security Council's relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission. In addition to addressing the growing role of Security Council committees and panels of experts, session III considered the basic characteristics, benefits and challenges of Security Council missions to the field.

Security Council missions

Several participants agreed that Security Council missions to the field are useful in providing first-hand impressions of local conditions, and give Council members a more hands-on feel for the actual results of their work at Headquarters. They offer an opportunity to meet Heads of State, parties to conflicts, representatives of civil society, and other local actors, as well as officials of regional and subregional organizations. One speaker, for example, suggested that, as a result of his trips to Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the Council, he

gained a better understanding of banditry in Cité Soleil, human rights problems in Goma, and the perspectives of President Kabila and senators in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Another participant added that such missions make Council members more aware of the implications of the decisions being made in New York.

Council missions also allow members to gain a better understanding of the workings of peacekeeping operations. As such missions have become more central to the work of the Council, they have attracted a higher level of press coverage. Mission participants are able to meet with interlocutors at the highest level, enabling them to deliver messages and to push directly for the implementation of Council decisions. Council missions, according to one speaker, also offer a good bonding experience with other Council members and allow them to gain a deeper understanding of the positions and perceptions of their colleagues, as well as of parties to the conflict.

The impact of such missions on the host countries was also raised as a matter of concern. One speaker suggested that, while interaction with the field is useful, missions sometimes undermine local capacities and do not include all the key stakeholders in the process of finding sustainable solutions to armed conflicts. Missions, therefore, should strive to support the needs of people on the ground. Likewise, one participant suggested that the Council do a better job of informing host countries about the objectives of the mission, so that meetings during these trips can be more constructive. It was also recommended that mission delegations do a better job of communicating Security Council messages — including its values, norms and expectations — when in host countries. Urging that missions be better planned by Council members, another discussant suggested that countries to be visited should be informed well in advance of the Council's intention to visit and that everything be done to ensure that all meetings with interlocutors take place as planned. To ensure more informed discussions back in New York on the substance of Security Council missions, one participant underlined that it would be helpful if mission reports are translated into all of the official languages before consultations on the issues raised in them are held.

On the modalities of Council missions, it was noted that each mission has specific terms of reference that have been negotiated in advance at Headquarters at the level of experts. In instances when the Council visits several countries on a single mission, each leg of the trip has its specific terms of reference. Each mission has a head, who is typically the Ambassador of the delegation that coordinated the issue for the Council in New York. At times, there have been several mission heads on the same trip when several countries were visited.

On organizing missions, the Secretariat facilitates the funding of the missions and assists in preparing the programme of meetings and in providing administrative arrangements for participants. One speaker noted that usually there is one participant from each Council member, although smaller missions have been organized in the past. The head of the mission usually brings along one expert, at her/his delegation's expense, while others usually travel unaccompanied. In response to a complaint from a participant about why some Ambassadors are allowed to bring an expert while others are not, another explained that in the past, when logistical arrangements permitted, Ambassadors could bring one expert at their delegation's expense. Council missions are usually planned well in advance by political coordinators, although some missions have been organized at very short

notice. For example, the Council mission in 2007 in connection with the Kosovo issue was organized in just two weeks.

As a rule, the Council visits countries and regions that appear on its agenda, with countries in Africa remaining the primary destination. One speaker commented on the need to carefully balance the programme of missions, citing an example when the Council spent three days each in Haiti and in Afghanistan, while visiting five countries in Africa in the course of a week. A second discussant suggested that, given the large United Nations presence in Africa, an annual visit to West Africa and the Great Lakes region would be a good idea. A third participant, on the other hand, recommended a Council mission to Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, or somewhere else in Asia in 2010, since the Council did not visit an Asian country in 2009.

Sanctions committees and other subsidiary bodies

Several speakers emphasized the large workload of Security Council committees. For non-permanent members, chairing almost all of the subsidiary bodies is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it gives them an opportunity to play leadership roles on critical issues. On the other hand, as one participant joked, it may be a clever way of keeping the elected members fully occupied. Citing the heavy workload and the need to meet various timelines, two participants characterized such work as challenging, yet rewarding. Another participant described sanctions committee work as usually being quiet, though punctuated by periods of heightened activity. There are deadlines for committee (and panel of expert) reports that need to be respected. Some committees have weekly meetings of a laborious nature. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban was cited as one example. It was also noted that the work of committees cannot be divorced from the political context in which they operate. Committees that seem to be dormant can suddenly become active, depending upon events. For example, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), focusing on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was relatively inactive for some time, has witnessed a resurgence of activity in recent months in response to missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Likewise, gun violence in the Sudan focuses attention on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, which oversees an arms embargo.

One discussant highlighted the roles and responsibilities of committee Chairs. To chair a committee effectively, he commented, one must enjoy working with young people. Except for the Chair, delegations are typically represented by hardworking and ambitious junior to mid-ranking diplomats. He encouraged other Permanent Representatives to nominate able junior staff, as it is important to have excellent collaborators in the substantive discussions of the committees. As an example, the speaker pointed to the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). Noting that each case addressed by the committee is unique, he stressed that analysing them required a strong knowledge of due process and the rule of law. It could be helpful, also, if committee Chairs could develop a working relationship with countries that are the object of a committee's work, since a functioning relationship would permit regular information exchanges. Moreover, if experts are forbidden to travel to the countries under sanctions because their visa applications are denied, the Chair could try to resolve problems directly with the United Nations mission concerned.

Several participants noted that, because the committees operate on the basis of consensus, reaching agreement in them is often more difficult than reaching agreement in the Council. On the other hand, several speakers pointed out that in instances when consensus is difficult to reach in a committee, the Chair has the option of bringing the issue to the level of Ambassadors in the Council. Nevertheless, one participant thought it peculiar that one member at the subsidiary body level could prevent a decision being taken and, in essence, block consideration of the question by the Council proper. Despite the fact that consensus is sometimes hard to achieve, another discussant asserted that the quest is worth it because of the message that unanimity sends on sensitive questions relating to sanctions and the development of norms. Commenting on the working methods of the committees, one participant stressed the need to have the relevant documents translated well in advance of discussing them at subsidiary body meetings. Another spoke about the importance of maintaining good working relationships among the committees, the panels of experts, peacekeeping operations or special political missions, and the Secretariat. It was noted that field missions play an important role in the implementation of Council sanctions.

Groups of experts

There was substantial discussion of the functions of panels of experts, including their relationship to the committees to which they are assigned. Speaking on the role of experts assisting sanctions regimes, as well as the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee, one speaker stressed the need for greater transparency in their selection. In her view, their work needs to be evaluated more closely and the nationalities of panel members should be more representative of the wider United Nations membership. In response, one participant gave the example of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). In that case, the experts, who are selected from around the world, support the Committee intellectually and in their professional capacities. The experts are appointed by the Secretary-General, following consultations with the Committee members. Once experts are appointed, they produce a variety of reports and normally the final report of the panel of experts is made public. At the same time, each committee decides on a case-by-case basis whether it wants to follow the recommendations of its panel of experts. In some cases, experts' reports are contentious and the committee members have distinct evaluations of them. According to one discussant, that was the case with an expert panel report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan/Darfur. It was evaluated differently by different members of the Committee, so there was no unanimous outcome of the Committee's work.

Session IV
Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2009

Moderator:

Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom

Commentators:

Ambassador Michel Kafando
Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso

Ambassador Le Luong Minh
Permanent Representative of Viet Nam

Ambassador Jorge Urbina
Permanent Representative of Costa Rica

Ambassador Ranko Vilović
Permanent Representative of Croatia

Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

This concluding session provided representatives of Member States leaving the Council at the end of 2009 with an opportunity to share insights and reflections on their experiences over the past two years. The discussions focused on the opportunities and challenges of serving on the Security Council, the dynamics of the relationship between permanent and elected members, and advice to the incoming class.

Opportunities and challenges

Speakers noted that serving on the Council provides a unique opportunity to have an impact on difficult issues. Among these, terrorism, non-proliferation and peacekeeping were emphasized. It was observed that being a Council member is also an excellent learning opportunity, as one must become knowledgeable on a wide range of peace and security issues affecting the world. One participant also declared that it had been an honour to work on the Council with such high calibre professional diplomats on so many engaging issues. However, it was observed also that entering the Council can initially be a daunting experience, as the weight of culture and tradition is palpable and may hinder one's efforts. One participant likened the experience to raising a first-born child: the parents lack experience and must rely on the help of friends and family, but eventually they get accustomed to the responsibilities. Entering the Council was also compared with the experience of a new government coming into power, as new Council members may have campaigned for many years to be elected, but, upon assuming their new responsibilities, they are acutely aware that they will have to manage a variety of difficult issues.

As one speaker observed, negotiations in the Council can be extremely challenging. When the outcome of a negotiation concerns complex and sensitive issues, he noted, diplomats on the Council must deal with multiple pressures. First, there are time pressures that come into play when a matter is perceived as urgent by some members of the Council. Second, elected members from smaller countries have fewer resources, such as independent sources of information. Consequently, they need to interact more effectively with countries in the region under consideration, as well as with independent organizations, in order to inform their analyses and decisions. Third, there is the need to keep one's Government informed of the Council's deliberations. Fourth, it is important to try to keep the media abreast of negotiations, so that capitals do not provide instructions to their delegations based on inaccurate press reports. Finally, it requires skill to accommodate the position of one's Government with that of other Governments.

Dynamics of the relationship between permanent and non-permanent members

During the course of the session, participants had a lively discussion of the role of the elected members and that of the permanent members in the Council's work. In emphasizing the importance of the distinction, one participant opined that the first and most dangerous idea for newly elected members is that there was no difference between permanent and non-permanent membership. Several members stressed that the simple fact of the enduring nature of the permanent members meant that they have institutional memory that gives them an advantage in procedural matters and substantive negotiations. Noting that one participant had earlier dismissed the issue of working methods as a sideshow, one discussant suggested that this was illustrative of the difference between permanent and non-permanent members. As for the role of the elected members, one participant underlined the importance of remembering that the elected Council members represent those Member States that elected them to be Council members. They would need to strike a balance between reflecting the views of their regions and defending their national interests. Stressing the need for elected members to identify certain issues on which they would focus during their tenures, another speaker noted that, while the elected members might not have a national interest in every item on the Council agenda, the permanent five almost always do.

Nonetheless, several speakers maintained that there is rarely a situation where there is a confrontational mode between permanent and non-permanent members. It was emphasized that on a personal level relations among representatives remain cordial despite political differences. One suggested that it would be absolutely artificial and distorting to see the Council through the lens of permanent versus elected members of the Council, as they all bear collective responsibility for international peace and security. Other speakers urged the elected members to support one another. According to one discussant, if elected members acted collectively, they could affect outcomes, but if they acted separately they could do little. Another speaker maintained that the role of the elected members is very important because they could diminish the tensions between different groups within the Council and help to work towards consensus. The way that coalitions develop among diverse members from different regions is quite interesting, commented one participant. One of the best experiences of being on the Council, in his view, is finding the connections and common causes across regions.

Several speakers emphasized that, without unity among the five permanent members, decisions could not be taken since they have the veto power. One speaker maintained, however, that when one of the permanent five vetoes a draft resolution it is, in fact, helping the Council to make a decision. In the end, though, cooperation among all 15 members is the preferred course of action. Another speaker noted that the Council worked smoothly when the permanent five worked well together. He noted that the permanent five tend to agree on institutional issues, as they see the downside of innovations and change since they have to live with them. This could explain the tension on issues of working methods. One participant commented that his delegation had been impressed by the unity of the permanent five in some cases, such as Western Sahara and the non-proliferation issues regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Another discussant contended, nonetheless, that agreement among the permanent five is the exception, as each of them has its own view on any given issue, and their relationship to the elected members is determined issue by issue. That is why the permanent five formed "alliances" with non-permanent members more often than with each other. Another speaker warned elected members to be very careful in

disagreeing with the permanent five when the latter are unified, unless one is prepared to resist their combined response.

Discussing the practical challenges faced by the elected members, several participants expressed frustration with situations in which a Council member provides a draft resolution or a draft presidential statement for Council action that has been prepared outside the Council. Such drafts are often prepared in cooperation with selected non-members or by so-called Groups of Friends, and then presented to the elected members for their stamp of approval. Such was the case with a draft prepared by the Group of Friends on Western Sahara. In that context, one speaker complained that sometimes the elected members are completely excluded from negotiations, while another observed that often in such situations certain States not members of the Council have more influence than the elected members. It was argued that elected members should be a part of negotiations from the start. Another participant advised elected members to be proactive and to request to be included in negotiations from an early stage. In his experience, if they so requested, they would not be rejected; if they did not ask, they might not be included.

A number of speakers cautioned that achieving their goals in the Council during their elected terms had often been challenging. One speaker noted the frustration in cases where an outcome required consensus and most members had agreed on a draft text. However, with just one member not willing to join the consensus, nothing could be done. Yet, another participant observed, delegations could often obtain their objectives by "horse-trading" and conditioning their support to other members, particularly to the permanent five.

Advice to newly elected members

Several speakers advised incoming Council members to develop strong relationships with multiple actors and to manage those relationships well. First, according to a couple of participants, it is important to have a good relationship with the Secretariat, non-governmental organizations and think tanks, because they can provide knowledge and information to elected members, which lack the institutional memory to compete with the five permanent members. Second, it was suggested that elected members should have a "bullet proof" relationship with their capitals, so that they are in a sufficiently strong position if permanent members voice objections to their respective capitals about their conduct on the Council. It was stressed, also, that elected members should make sure to coordinate their policy approaches with capitals. Third, it was suggested that elected members develop strong relations with both elected and permanent members to prepare themselves for their work on the Council. One participant, however, cautioned elected members not to feel a heightened sense of importance about being on the Council and to be wary of what he called "the courtship of the P-5".

Several speakers identified the Secretariat as a vital source of information for elected members. As elected members do not always have good intelligence about country situations on the Council agenda, they often have to rely on information supplied by the permanent members or by the Secretariat. Another participant specifically praised the usefulness of political and military briefings organized by the Secretariat. Agreeing on the importance of maintaining a functional relationship with the Secretariat, one speaker noted that often the reports produced by the Secretariat were delayed and "watered down" because of the multiple levels of clearance that they underwent. He argued, however, that a good working

relationship with the Secretariat could result in obtaining more candid background information and opinions that have not made it into the final reports.

Closely related to developing and managing relationships, one discussant observed that effective communication with non-members of the Council, the broader policy community, and the public is a key element of a Council member's work. He observed that non-members, non-governmental organizations and think tanks generally crave information about what is going on in the Council, especially during crises. In turn, their work can boost the flow of information and analysis to Council members. For his part, the representative said that he informs members of his country's regional group of the Council's work on a weekly basis, while also striving to provide quality and timely information to other actors outside the Council whenever possible.

Speaking of the need for delegations to set clear goals for their terms on the Council, most speakers advised the new members to choose their priorities carefully, while taking account of their limited resources. Some participants suggested that elected members are generally less driven by their national agendas and better positioned to address some issues impartially. In that context, one discussant suggested that, in the absence of clear national interests, elected members should closely consult the history of their country in order to act on the basis of their national values and the pillars of their national foreign policies. Another speaker urged the newly elected members to build trans-regional alliances on the basis of shared principles and ideas, such as transparency and legitimacy. The outgoing members encouraged the new ones to leave their footprints on the Council and not to be intimated by other members.

It was noted that, for elected members to achieve their goals, they must let the rest of the Council members know what those goals are. They should also gain the support of other Council members prior to bringing any issue to the Council. No Council delegation liked surprises. Initiatives that are not carefully prepared are likely to be "voted down or watered down".

Incoming members were advised to ensure that their missions are staffed with knowledgeable and experienced officers. However, one speaker also emphasized the importance of improvising and husbanding the finite resources at the disposal of most elected members. This should be done according to a clear set of priorities established upon entering the Council. Underlining the value of knowing the Council's procedures to protect the interests of the "weak" in the Council, one discussant encouraged the newly elected members to invest time in studying the provisional rules of procedure. Another speaker highlighted the need to support mission staff through, for example, organizing training sessions for expert level staff.

On a broader strategic level, one participant advised elected members to set clear goals for what they want to accomplish in the Council and to develop an agenda for accomplishing those goals. Elected members, according to another participant, should strive to make it clear to other Council members what they stand for, what their concerns are, and what legacy they want to leave in the Council. However, this same speaker cautioned that elected members should balance their national interests in the Council with the interests of the broader United Nations membership, which elected them to the Council in the first place.

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Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

General and complete disarmament

Sixty-fifth anniversary of the end of the Second World War

Identical letters dated 29 March 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith declarations by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in connection with the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (annex I) and the sixty-fifth anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have these declarations circulated as documents of the current session of the General Assembly under agenda items 96 and 126, respectively, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

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Annex I to the identical letters dated 29 March 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in connection with the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

25 March 2010 Moscow

We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, aware of the need to ensure the effective functioning of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as one of the support mechanisms of the collective security system, reaffirm our strong support for the Treaty and welcome multilateral efforts to strengthen it.

On the basis of objective and comprehensive analysis of past problems and current challenges in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, the forthcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference should develop an agreed package of measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty and ensuring that all parties to the Treaty unconditionally comply with their obligations on the basis of the indivisibility of its three fundamental pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Contemporary proliferation threats can and must be eliminated on the basis of the Treaty. We call for the verification capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be strengthened and expanded, including by establishing additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements as the universally accepted standard for verifying NPT parties' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

Reaffirming our commitment to the noble goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, we support the efforts of States related to the fulfilment of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. The conclusion of a new legally binding treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons will make a substantive contribution to disarmament efforts, bearing in mind the inseparable link between such reductions and the deployment of global anti-ballistic missile defence systems.

We look forward to all nuclear-weapon States systematically joining the disarmament efforts of the Russian Federation and the United States.

We support globalizing the obligations in the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles.

We are convinced of the need to give a new impetus to multilateral formats. Important steps in the process of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the non-proliferation regime should be: the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the launch at the Conference on Disarmament of

negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We note with satisfaction the entry into force on 21 March 2009 of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and the holding of the first consultative meeting of its States parties. We emphasize the role of this zone in promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the environmental rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive contamination.

At the same time, we note the need for every possible assistance in matters related to the safe and reliable storage of radioactive waste in Central Asia.

Stressing the importance of increasing confidence among States, we support discussion at the 2010 NPT Review Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty receiving assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. We express our readiness to facilitate the swift conclusion of the appropriate arrangements.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference should determine how best to ensure that all NPT State parties have unhindered access to the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that they comply with their non-proliferation obligations in good faith. We emphasize the relevance of the initiative to develop a global nuclear energy infrastructure and to establish international centres providing nuclear fuel cycle services. We are committed to working constructively with all NPT States parties in order to ensure the success of the 2010 Review Conference and to consolidate international efforts aimed at maximizing the Treaty's potential with a view to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons while promoting disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Annex II to the identical letters dated 29 March 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in connection with the sixty-fifth anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945

25 March 2010 Moscow

The forthcoming sixty-fifth anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, won through the heroism and self-sacrifice of the peoples of our countries, reminds us once more of the massive loss of human life and the achievement of those who, at the cost of their lives, deprivation and suffering, brought liberation and peace to the world in the struggle against fascism. We honour and respect their memories.

The tragic lessons of history from the troubled war years have not been forgotten; they live on in the minds of people and call on us to act in defence of peace.

We consider unacceptable any attempts to revise the historical significance of the victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and the outcome of the Second World War, or to distort the assessment of that period.

Today humanity is facing a broad range of serious security threats and challenges, and a growth in manifestations of neo-Nazi ideology, extremism and xenophobia. In this context, the collective efforts during the Second World War by the international community to ensure its subsequent peaceful and stable development take on particular significance.

The States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization support close cooperation with other international organizations and are determined, through collective action, to do their utmost to strengthen regional and international security and stability, and to resolve conflicts by exclusively peaceful means.

Marking the glorious anniversary of the victory, the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization call on the international community to work together to establish a world order based on the principles of international law and equal and indivisible security for all countries.